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The Prediction of Structural Failures 
Abstract 
This thesis is mainly concerned with the prediction of on-- 
class of structural failure, namely that due to the extrapolation of 
existing design or construction procedures to fit new situations. 
Four failures were examined in depth in an attempt to establish 
a realistic procedure for avoiding such accidents. The. structures 
studied were large metal bridges because these have represented the 
forefront of technology for as long or longer than any comparable 
example. The examples chosen were the Dee Railway Bridge (collapsed 
1847), the Tay Bridge (1879), the first Quebec cantilever bridge (1907) 
and the Tacoma Narrows suspension bridge (1940). G 
/eat 
care was 
taken to study the accidents and preceding events as contemporary' engineers 
would have seen them, and it is believed that this is the first time this 
type. of investigation has been made. 
The pattern that emerged from this was that the designers all used 
existing data which they were confident applied to their work. Not 
until after the accident did it become apparent that this was not the 
case, and that the data had originally been derived with very different 
conditions in mind, often for applications which seemed insignificant 
alongside the failed structure. 
In conclusion the author suggests how similar situations could be 
avoided in the future by the setting up of review procedures to assess 
new developments in the light of existing practices and the facts on 
which these are based. An outline of the costs of the accidents studied- 
suggests very strongly that such work would 
be economically justifiable. 
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The Prediction of Structural Failures 
1 Introduction 
. -'1.1 The Study of Structural Safety 
This thesis is concerned with one very important aspect of 
the general study of structural safety, namely the prediction-of 
design situations in which disasters are likely to occur. Since 
the main subject matter only covers a small part of the overall field 
of safety in civil engineering, it is as well to begin by drawing a 
general picture of work that has been done on all aspects of the subject, 
with a view to putting the present study into perspective. 
To start with 
.a 
definition, -to be considered safe a structure has 
to be capable of sustaining all reasonable loads applied to it through- 
out its design life without collapsing, without exhibiting undue deflec- 
tions and without requiring excessive maintenance. This suggests two 
possible ways of. studying the subject; either a safety philosophy is 
applied to the design process to guarantee that new structures will 
stand up;. ors under one guise-or another, measures are devised to make 
sure they will not fall down. Both methods have advantages and dis- 
advantages, as can be shown by an outline of work accomplished during the 
last 25 years. 
The need for a coherent safety philosophy was first put to the Civil 
Engineering profession by AG Pugsley in a paper written in 19511 In. 
this paper, the author pointed out--t at it was anomalous to continue using 
the traditional, but' largely empirical 'safety factors' in conjunction 
with the increasingly sophisticated techniques of modern analysis. He 
-3- 
envisaged several possible developments all of which he and others have 
worked on'since. 
---One of the measures he advocated was a return to factors of safety based 
on loads (i. e. the ratio of working to collapse loads). A method of 
calculating appropriate safety margins from this criterion was outlined 
in the Report of the Institution of Structural Engineers Safety Committee 
which appeared in 1955.2 
Here it was suggested that the uncertainty of the various aspects 
of the design process (such as predicted loading, accuracy of analysis, 
workmanship, danger to personnel, and cost of safety measures) should 
each be assessed individually. A rational margin of safety could then 
be calculated by ascribing numerical values to each element and combining 
these partial safety factors by multiplication. - 
In 1971 a report was produced by the Safety Committee of the 
Construction Industry's Research & Information Association. This 
discussed the partial safety factor approach with particular reference 
to the advantages and disadvantages that had been revealed by several 
years application to the design of reinforced concrete and other 
structures. 
It was found that the rationalisation of-the individual safety 
factors was hampered by lack of information. For example, knowledge of 
external loads left much to be desired (except in isolated instances 
such as wind loading where much progress had been made), as did know- 
ledge of the actual stren%fl'i'of existing structures. The only way 
of improving matters was seen to be by the collection of an immense 
-4- 
amount*of data for each class of structure and each type of load, a 
problem which was made doubly difficult by the fact that so many large 
civil engineering works are essentially one-off jobs. 4 
Id the future there will undoubtedly be progress with this approach, 
but it is bound to be slow and painstaking, and for a long while intuitive 
as giuch as rational. Pugsley, who was chairman of both committees seems 
3 
to have realised this, as did the recent Interim Committee on Structural 
" Safety sponsored jointly by the Institutions of Civil, Structural and 
Municipal Engineers 
4- 
Another safety philosophy, based on the mathematical probability 
of a failure resulting from an unusually weak structure being acted on 
by an abnormally high load is also restricted in application at the 
present time by a lack of loading and strength-data, strength data in 
particular being virtually unobtainable without tests to destruction 
(impracticable for most civil engineering structures) or a return to proof 
loading acceptance tests. 
Both these approaches suffer from real problems relating to the 
human user. In the partial load factor case a risk of danger to personnel 
which may seem reasonable to the designer because it is parallel to 
other risks the user takes may in fact be unacceptable. Pugsley, for 
example, has pointed out that travellers on a Motorway expect a much 
greater level of-safety from the bridges-they cross than from the. cars 
they travel in 
5 
This was recently demonstrated, when, during the ¬21m 
strengthening of Tinsley Viaduct in Sheffield to meet the requirements 
of the Merrison box girder rules a lorry ran out of control and through 
the bridge parapet because no crash barrier (cost £30,000 per mile) had 
been installed. In the mathematical strength/load treatment a clearly 
-5- 
defined probability of failure has to be designed for, and this has also 
proved unacceptable to the public cognoscenti. 
In the light of these remarks there is clearly scope for work 
based on human parameters. The public, for example, welcomes direct 
attempts to restrict accidents because that is its main concern, and 
indeed safety rules such as the International Airworthiness Regulations 
for aircraft are based on actual accident rates. In the author's 
opinion, conscious effort aimed-at minimising the incidence of accidents 
is a necessary complement to work on the general philosophy of safety, 
and it is this aspect of the field that was seiected for study in this 
thesis. 
The most obvious way of endeavouring to reduce the numbers of 
accidents is by examining-past--failures and seeing what, if anything, 
they have had in common. With this aim in mind several other writers 
have made collections of accident case histories, but usually the field 
covered and the conclusions drawn have been so general as to be bewildering 
to the reader. 'Works that fall into this category include Stamm's 
"Bruckeneinsturze und Ihres Lehren" (1952), Rolt Hammond's "Engineering 
Structural Failures"(1956), McKaig's "Building Failures"(1962), Feld's 
"Construction Failures"(1968), the Institution of Civil Engineer's 
report on "Safety in Engineering"(1969) and Scott's "Building Disasters 
and Failures"(1976). All of these proceed by a recitation of the 
circumstances surrounding many collapses and the mistakes to be avoided 
in the future. This is unsatisfactory because it results in such a 
vast check list of 
points 
to be considered that a designer who consults 
and follows it may be lulled into a sense of security that dulls his 
fundamental thinking about safety matters. 
6 
"- As a result one aim of this thesis is to discipline the study of 
failures, 
"or at 
least some part of it, so that it helps designers in 
a positive rather than a negative way. This is done by using the 
records of previous accidents to predict the possibility of future 
collapses rather than to eulogise" on past catastrophes. 'With respect 
to accident case histories this means looking for patterns of events 
rather than at each collapse individually. 
"L 
. bý 
ýYý 
.ýý... 
ýý J 
'^ý 
r 
-7- 
1.2 Types of Accident 
A sensible starting point for the study of collapses is to classify 
what can usefully be studied. 
r 
Structural accidents, it seems, fall into three categories of which 
two can usefully be researched. This thesis is mainly concerned with 
the possibility of avoiding one of the types, but it is as well to begin 
by setting out all three categories. 
Firstly, there are accidents due to causes such as simple calculation 
errors or straightforward mistakes on site. This class of failure 
includes any incident whose cause is immediately obvious to an average 
engineer reviewing the facts. Most accidents fall into this category, 
but so long as human beings are fallible there. is probably not much that 
can be done to prevent them. 
Next there are accidents due to causes such as-earthquakes, floods 
or hurricanes which are traditionally looked on as acts of God but which 
in fact can be guarded against by the collection of sufficient loading 
data. Knowledge of the probability of a certain loading being exceeded 
enables a designer to take a calculated risk in his specification of a 
" new structure. The problem of avoiding this type of accident or of 
keeping the number of instances down to an acceptable level is properly 
the preserve of the scientists specialising in the collection and analysis 
of the loading information. 
The third type of accident is the smallest category but is also the 
most significant because relatively simple measures could be applied to 
largely prevent the occurrence of similar disaster situations in the future. 
i 
8 
In this class of failure, the distinguishing feature of the structures 
is that although the design complies with the accepted practice of the 
day, the structure is intriniscally incapable of sustaining the loads 
applied to it. The primary cause of such accidents is frequently 
found to be the use of a design method, construction technique or 
material unwittingly applied outside its range of validity - usually 
some principle has been developed and then used for ever larger applications 
until finally it is mistakenly employed for a structure of, such scale and 
geometric proportions that a fundamentally different approach is required. 
By studying the history of certain structures which have failed in the 
past it is possible to detect a repeating pattern of events which., could 
be broken if certain theasiires were taken to break dangerous cycles of 
development. 
ý 
. 3' 94_ .. _ __ .. 
, ar. ý ý,. 
1.3 Area of Study 
-9- 
The subject area selected for this thesis was the study of this 
type of accident as illustrated by the history of large metal bridges. 
Thi_ class of structure was selected because it has always represented 
the vanguard of a particular area of structural history, namely the appli- 
cation of iron to building purposes. Just as the cast-iron. arch at 
Ironbridge in the Severn Gorge was-the first important load bearing 
structure to be made of metal (1779), so the Dee Railway Bridge at 
Chester (opened 1846, collapsed 1847) was the longest cast iron trussed 
girder, earlier applications having been confined to factories (under 
the guise of fireproof buildings), or shorter spans over or under 
railways. 
During the age of wrought iron (roughly 1850-1885) the huge 
spans of the Britannia (1849), Saltash (1859), Clifton (1863) and 
G a. rabit (1885) bridges were only rivalled as construction projectg by 
the mighty Tour Eiffel in Paris (1889, height 300m), the St Pancras 
Station roof (1870 span 70m length 210m) and by ships such as Brunel's 
Great Britain and Great Eastern. Another structure of great daring 
dating from this period was Sir Thomas Bouch's sinuous Tay Bridge (opened 
1878, collapsed the following year), stretching for two miles across 
one of the roughest and most exposed estuaries in the British Isles and 
representing an attempt to combat extreme loading conditions with a 
structure of ruthless economy. 
1 
I 
In the years following the introduction of steel the great Forth 
Bridge (1889) with main spans of 530m and towers rising 102m from their 
foundations was a symbol of achievement challenged only by the New York 
skyscrapers and the ill-fated Quebec Bridge (collapsed during construction 
in 1907). 
10 
During the twentieth century there has been an explosion in the 
dimensions of all sorts of structures. The world's tallest building 
is now 444m high (Sears Tower Chicago) and steel masts stretch over 600m 
' into the sky. In the field of bridging the greatest span achieved 
by ': ie. suspension form now favoured for all, -. long unobstructed crossings 
has risen from 486m (Brooklyn 1883) to 1410m (Humber Bridge, due for 
completion in 1977). During this period one exceptionally daring if 
not outstandingly long structure collapsed. This was the Tacoma Narrows 
Bridge which failed in 1940. - 
The four accidents just mentioned make up the body of this thesis 
because they all fit the criterion that defines the class of failure 
selected for study. In. each case the structure which collapsed was 
preceded by the seemingly logical development and extrapolation of a 
design principle. Disaster resulted when changes made in the parameters 
involved led to the structure behaving, not in the way earlier examples 
had done, but--in a-new and- unpredicted fashion. 
r 
1.4. Method of Study 
- 11 - 
The principal novelty of this thesis lies in detecting and 
demonstrating that this pattern exists and that it repeats itself from 
time to time. The study looks beyond the. super! icial details of what 
happened when a structure collapsed and examines the processes that led 
up to the disaster, because it is there that the fundamental similarities 
between the accidents are to be found. 
Although the thesis is only concerned with one pattern and one area 
of the whole construction process, the author believes that it is typical 
of a number of similar patterns that could be isolated in fields such as 
the use of materials and the application of certain fabrication techniques. 
The use of cast iron, firstly for arches but later in beams is an 
example of the first topic, while the failure of welded bridges in 
Belgium and Germany in the 1930s illustrates the latter. 
This study is the first, so far as the author knows, to investigate 
accidents in this way. In addition to establishing that the four 
failures described were the result of a similar approach to the design 
" problem, the author shows that certain measures could have been taken 
to prevent the design cycle ending in disaster. 
The most important of these is to suggest that the continuous 
collection and publication'of data in parametric form relating to the 
structures in a particular class would help a designer assess the 
basic degree of risk taken in developing some aspect of the design. This 
applies particularly to structures where there is a reasonable degree of 
uniformity, and only to a lesser extent to those of great individuality. 
The studies suggest that the designers of the structures discussed herein 
12 
did not appreciate the size of the step forward they were taking, and 
that had they done so they would have made proper recourse to experimen- 
tation. 
Another measure discussed provides clues that a disaster situation-1Pr T 
was imminent in each case. This, rather surprisingly, is the unusual 
fact that each accident was preceded by a number of similar incidents 
on a smaller scale which, although recorded, were not wholly understood 
by the engineers of the day. This suggests that it is worthwhile to 
keep a register of all structural failures where the cause cannot be 
wholly explained in the hope that this would highlight uncertainties and 
stimulate research where it is required. The importance of keeping this 
accident history file separate from one covering the general run of 
collapses cannot be over-emphasised. 
.ý 
_ _13 
1.5 Earlier Studies 
Having outlined the method of study used in this thesis, it is 
worthwhile reviewing the work of earlier writers who have discussed 
the four bridge accidents. 
In each case the first investigation was carried out under some 
form of Government Commission supported in one of a number of ways, but 
always with sufficient legal power to investigate all the circumstances 
of the collapse. 
The Dee Bridge failure of 1847 was the subject of a dramatic Coroner's 
Inquest, nominally to determine the cause of death of those unfortunate 
enough to be killed in the accident but in fact more concerned with 
determining the cause of the collapse since at. that time there was no 
6 
established way of investigating a structural failure. The Jury returned 
a strongly worded verdict calling for an inquiry into the application 
of iron to railway structures, which materialised as a Royal Commission 
shortly afterwards? The Commissioners, under the chairmanship of Lord 
Wrottesley, concentrated on solving the problems isolated at the Inquest 
relating to uncertainties in the use of iron for railway bridges. 
These included the resistance of structures to static forces and the 
provision required for impact and rolling loads. They also compared 
the different types of bridge that could be used for railways and 
included a long appendix on the then fashionable tubular structures. 
Their report also drew attention to uncertainties revealed.. in the course 
of their inquiries, incluViiig matters such as the precise physical properties 
of cast and wrought iron. 
There was, however, no attempt at understanding why the original 
accident happened when and how it did, which is what the present study 
- 14 - 
sets out to do. Much the same can be said about the Report of the Tay 
Bridge Inquiry (in fact the Commissioners produced two reports more or 
'less parallel in content except that one saw fit to apportion blame for 
. _the accident onto 
individuals. ) Here the Commissioners examined the 
prii. cipal witnesses more or less in the manner of a_criminal trial, 
" 
raking over the many malpractices that passed unchecked during the 
construction of the bridge, and partially eclipsing the true'cause of 
the accident which was insufficient provision for wind forces. 
Having drawn attention to the shameful workmanship and indifferent 
project management, and having isolated the wind-loading problem as 
} 
requiring further research they considered their task completed. They 
made no study of how it had been possible for Thomas Bouch to design 
and construct an inadequate structure for the longest crossing in the 
world in full view of the whole engineering profession. This is now 
attempted for the first time. 
Whereas the Tay Bridge Inquiry was beset with the very unpleasant 
and hostile atmosphere of a courtroom, the Quebec Bridge investigation 
resulted in an extremely well-balanced and-impartial report 
9 
Here-the-- ~--ýý 
Commissioners devoted some attention"to! tracing the history of the data. -.,. 
which was used in the design with such disastrous consequences. This 
in the Commissioners' view merely showed that the background-of research 
and experiment was inadequate, but their work is here extended to show 
how an ongoing historical study could-have enabled the accident situation 
to be foreseen. 
The destruction of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge was investigated along 
s 
similar lines although the minutes of evidence were never published in 
full. In the case of this I which was the last bridge to be studied, 
the investigators made a sketchy attempt to put. the collapse into 
- 15 - 
perspective in a manner quite similar to that adopted by the present 
author, although this was unknown to him while carrying out work on 
the other studies. However, the Commissioners made no real attempt 
" 
to assess precisely what the use of the historical material might 
" be in preventing similar situations arising in the future, so the 
' originality of this particular case history lies in expanding their 
material to do just that by referring to additional sources. . The 
Tacoma Bridge Commissioners did not, of course, draw parallels with the 
other three failures. ' 
Much time has elapsed since these accidents and the last three 
have featured time and again in literature about bridges. However 
among the general books, of which Tyrell's"History of Bridge Engineering"(1911); 
Steinman and Watson's "Bridges and their Builders"(1941), Gies' "Bridges 
and Men" (1964) and Hopkins' "A Span of Bridges"(1971) are a fair 
cross-section, the accidents are just treated as isolated events in 
the general chronology of bridge building except in the-case of the 
Tacoma Narrows Bridge where one or two of the earlier aerodynamic collapses 
are sometimes mentioned. 
" 
". 
' 
1.6 Source Material 
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The study of accidents, as this thesis shows, deserves to go 
deeper than this. Just as the building of the great triumphs of 
engineering merits the step by step retelling of all the stages of 
design and construction, so understanding and prevention of accidents 
demands that the history of how the engineers of the day thought and 
acted, as they made the decisions that ended in tragedy, be recorded. 
The manner of studying accidents herein presented takes as its 
starting point the premise-that people of different generations react 
to certain 'climates' and conditions in more or less the same way. It 
is therefore necessary to try and make the characters of people long dead 
and the circumstances in which they work come alive again. Much time 
has been spent in reading original writings and discussions, in studying 
old journals and periodicals, textbooks and manuscripts. This work 
has been greatly facilitated by ready access to the British Transport 
Record Office, and the libraries of the British Museum and the 
Institution of Civil Engineers. 
As the studies were built up so the life of the engineers of history 
became real and not merely that of hard work justly rewarded (as 
portrayed by the famous biographer Samuel Smiles) nor of folly 
crowned with disaster. -On the contrary, our forbears emerged as 
genuinely human, with human talents, ambitions, pride, jealousies and 
weaknesses just like ourselves. 
The writer who inspired the present author's interest' in the human 
aspect of engineering h toffy was the late LTC Rolt who was the, 
first biographer to make the great engineers of the past live again 
as people. Mention should also be made of a book by'P SA Berridge 
17 
entitled "The Girder Bridge" (published in 1969) which discusses the 
Dee Bridge failure and its aftermath in the words of the people involved 
at the time. ' Although Berridge wrote before the recent collapses of 
- box girder bridges at Yarm and Milford Haven, his book shows the' 
astonishing similarity of professional and public reaction one 
hundred and twenty years apart. In fact, it was the present 
author's reading of Berridge's discussion of the Dee Bridge and the 
Report of the West Gate Bridge Royal Commission simultaneously that 
really stimulated his interest in looking, 
_- 
for the pattern now presented. 
L 
0 
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2.1 Introduction 
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The River Dee at Chester is an unexceptional river between 
60 and 90m (200-300 feet) wide, with a tidal range of 3.6m (12 ieet). 
The waterway was spanned in 1832 when the great masonry arch of the 
Grosvenor Bridge strode across the river with an unprecedented leap 
of 61m (200 feet), so, in the early 1840s the directors of the 
new Chester & Holyhead Railway Company did not foresee the crossing 
as presenting an obstacle in any way comparable to the proposed sea wall 
traverse at Penmaenmawr, or the crossings of the Menai Straits & Conway 
estuary which were to enable their project to complete the line of rail- 
way between London and the port for Ireland. 
In 1844, when the directors felt that the time was ripe to 
commence construction, they commissioned a report from James Rendel, who 
proposed a bridge of brick arches because clearance for shipping did 
not have to be provided. Put in his own words, "There is very little 
probability that it (the river upstream) will ever be required for 
shipping as there is ample space for any probable extension of the 
trade of the port, lower down the river, in the vicinity of the 
present wharves, where there is deeper water and. where the canal basin 
1. ' 
is situated. " The bridge he sketched had 18.3m(60') spans, with a 
clearance of 6m (20') above high water level. 
After the Parliamentary Act- permitting construction of the 
Railway had been passed in July 1844, Robert Stephenson, newly appointed 
as Chief Engineer to the Company, made firm plans for crossing the Dee 
on a bridge of five brick arches. Very soon the first of a series of 
design problems along the new line of railway made itself apparent when 
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piling in the river bed revealed poor quality foundations. Stephenson 
and his staff were thus faced with designing a new, lighter bridge to 
fit the boundary conditions imposed by the already advancing approaches, 
which were a cutting on the Welsh side and an arched viaduct from 
Chester. These demanded a 76m (250') crossing of the river on it curve 
3.2 km (2 miles) radius and a basic skew of 510 (see figure 2.1). 
A timber viaduct, ising the piers already begun, might have been 
considered as an alternative under different circumstances, but here 
} Stephenson must have felt a need to show the directors and shareholders 
of the Railway Company that they had indeed selected the right engineer 
to carry their line in a permanent and masterly fashion along the difficult 
route to Holyhead. 
With timber and masonry excluded as structural materials the only 
remaining possibility was iron, which (as John Storey said in 1844) 
2 
bridge engineers were encouraged to build with because "it uses a material 
produced in this country better and cheaper than elsehwere, and assists 
one of its staple manufactures, which is at-this moment much depressed. * 
The form of iron bridge which Stephenson and his staff might have 
'considered were summarised in the"Report of the Commissioners Appointed 
to Inquire into the Application of Iron to Railway Structures" which 
was published in 1849. The Commissioners derived their information 
from the "Returns of Iron Bridges" made by the Railway companies in 
response to a Board of Trade letter circulated after the Dee Bridge 
collapsed. 
3 
(Table 2.1. ) 
1 
They listed the bow and string girder, the cast iron arch , 
the truss bridge, the tubular bridge, the built girder and the trussed 
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Fig 2.1. The site of the Dee railway bridge. 
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cast iron girder as possible ways of employing iron in bridges where 
the span was greater than that obtainable with a simple beam. ý 
In the Commissioners' Report, several leading engineers (but not 
Stephenson) agreed in considering the bow-string girder with a bow of 
cast or wrought iron cells and tension rods of wrought iron as free 
from any objections and urged against other modes of combining the 
materials. The form was first used in two bridges in Leeds built 
by George Leather in 1827 and 1832 respectively, (note that 
Whipple, who patented the idea in 1841, was not the originator of the 
genre). Robert Stephenson's bridge over the Grand Junction Canal 
at Weedon was another early example, and when the Dee Bridge fell the 
celebrated High Level Bridge as Newcastle was under construction (fig. 2.2). 
These bridges, using cast iron cells for the bow, unfortunately generated 
rather cumbersome and expensive structures, and it was not 'until wrought 
iron was used throughout that the form became really economical. 
WC Harrison's 170 foot span over the River Ouse, completed in 1848, 
appears to have been the first completely wrought iron example. 
The cast iron arch generally proved uneconomical for iron. 
-railway bridges, because although 
the material was cheaper than wrought 
iron, any saving was offset by-the need to provide extensive abutments. 
The problems of restricted clearance and headroom beneath the bridge 
could only be overcome by extensive approach embankments (fig. 2.3). 
Truss bridgework eventually dominated the middle range of railway 
spans, but in 1845 British engineers did not realise its potential 
5 
The various forms shown in fig 2.4 were applied to American railways 
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from the earliest days, but the first examples, dating from c. 1840 
were made of timber and proved insufficiently strong to cope with the 
imposed loads. Thus they were not widely imitated on this side of the 
Atlantic. -A few lattice and Howe type girders were built on the 
" Dublin-Drogheda railway in 1842, but these were not a success because 
the joints were inadequate to deal with the loads (fig. 2.5). These 
structures became dangerously springy and expensive to maintain. 
Robert Stephenson disapproved of them for these reasons and also because 
in iron examples the top chord tended to buckle -a phenomenon which later 
caused foreign engineers a lot of trouble. "" 
A few years after the Dee disaster, tubular girders built on the 
principles outlined in Fairbairn's patent of 1846 provided an excellent 
way of spanning distances up to 50m. (fig. 2.6). Unfortunately when 
Stephenson was considering the design of the Dee Bridge in 1845, Fairbairn 
= had not completed-development-af-! the-new form he was_evolving -from_. 
the----_- -:; 
relatively new technology of riveted wrought iron plates. Thus, in 
January 1846, when he suggested that tubular girders might be employed 
for crossing the Dee, the idea was rejected. However, when the firm 
was first employed, in a 21m (60') span carrying the Blackburn and Bolton 
Railway over the Leeds and Liverpool Canal (1847), the Fairbairn design J' 
showed a 50% saving in materials relative to an alternative trussed 
cast iron girder. 
The built girder (fig. 2.7) consisted of separate castings fitted 
closely at the joints and bolted together. A wrought iron clip was 
sometimes added over thd'''tension flange to make the system look more 
secure. By 1845 engineers found that this form was a wasteful way of 
obtaining long spans, because it was obviously undesirable to stress 
-23- 
material used in this way to any very high level. 
The trussed girder bridge (fig. 2.8) was a development of the built 
girder, and can be most simply described as sections of cast iron beam 
bolted together end to end and assisted by a wrought iron trussing 
system. By 1841 this form of bridge was not uncommon where it was 
necessary to cross more than 10-13 m (30-40') with a structure of 
minimum construction depth, typical applications being for railways 
crossing canals and rivers where economy dictated that the necessary 
headroom be provided without the extensive approach embankments required 
for an iron or masonry arch. It was a practical solution to the problem 
of making long beams from a material with very poor tensile strength 
and a susceptibility to brittle failure. Whereas for spans of up to 
13 m (40') simple cast iron beams were almost invariably used, for 
, longer distances accurate evenly cooled casting was impossible and long 
distance transport quite impracticable. The first trussed girder 
structures were built by Charles Vignoles on the Northern Union Railway 
in Lancashire (see Table 2.2) and were little more than a direct adap- 
tation of what was being incorporated in contemporary iron-framed mills 
where the function ofthe wrought iron was only to bind the cast iron 
in the event of a fracture 
6 
(fig. 2.9)" There is evidence that this 
idea worked in practice because a span designed by Stephenson in 1839 to 
cross the River Lea at Tottenham' failed after a few months service. 
GP Bidder (the contractor for the line) reported to the Institution of 
Civil Engineers in April 1847 that the wrought iron links had saved 
the structure from collapse; ".. The. trains ran over the bridge for some 
time when, without any notice one of the girders broke, where, if 
afterwards was shown, an imperfection existed in the metal; the tension 
24 
rods, however, supported the flaw and held the parts so 
tightly together that the trains passed over as usual until the 
accident was repaired. " 
7 
During the period 1831 to 1C45 the trussed girder underwent 
a haphazard development of increasing spans (fig. 2. lO) culminating in the 
30.5 m crossing of the Dee Bridge. Only in the latter stage of the 
evolution was an attempt made to add to the strength of the girder by 
prestressing the wrought iron, and then only by Robert Stephenson and 
(asterisked structures in Table 2.2) -his assistants. 
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2.2 History of the Design 
When the Dee Bridge was designed in 1845, Stephenson had to choose 
between the various types of structure just described. In fact the 
range was rather narrower than suggested, because the embryonic jtate of ý""ý 
the tubular and truss girder forms ruled these two out as serious 
possibilities. Also, by the date in question the built girder and 
cast iron arch had more efficient counterparts (for medium spans) in the 
trussed cast iron and bow and string girders respectively. 
On the whole it is surprising that Stephenson did not use bow 
and string girders, because, with the Chester and Holyhead directors 
ready to pay huge sums for crossing the River Conway and the Menai 
Straits he could have been expected to aim at providing something 
outwardly more solid and durable at the Dee Crossing that a-: trussed 
girder. 
Why then, did he use this type of structure? Probably because there 
was a fashion for trussed girders at the time of the railway mania 
(1844-50) presumably derived from the fact that these bridges symbolised 
something of the subtlety of modern technology. 
They had not been popular during the first period of railway build- 
ing (1825-1840) as can be seen from Table 2.1. which indicates the 
distribution of underline iron bridges on the railway network in 1847. 
Confirmation of this view is found in the only major book-on bridges 
of the period, Weale's treatise of 1843, 'in which the forms recommended 
for underline structures are masonry and cast iron arches and timber 
trusses. There is no mention at all of trussed cast iron girders. 
il 
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Stephenson (or rather his assistant, Charles Wild, who probably 
carried out the design under minimal supervision) was probably swayed 
by three considerations in making his final choice. Firstly a 
trussed girder bridge could be built economically and quickly, thus 
opening the line for the carriage of building materials. Secondly, 
fear of pier subsidence demanded light, simply-supported spans. 
Lastly, the trussed girder used in 3,30.5 m (98') spans offered the 
engineer the opportunity to achieve every bridge-builder's secret 
desire, which is to build the longest span constructed in'a particular 
form. 
Figures 2.11 to 2.13 show the important features of the bridge 
as constructed in 1845-1846: they are mostly taken from the report 
prepared by Mr Walker and Capt. Simmons after the accident. 
The 30.5 m (98') spans were achieved using large cast iron components 
up to 11 m (36') long. These were very nearly the largest size that 
could be satisfactorily manufactured, and in the completed structure 
some of the castings had visible distortion, probably due to the mould 
being inaccurate or to the metal cooling unevenly. The need to pour 
the metal into the mould quickly in order to prevent this latter effect 
meant that it was difficult to exclude pockets of air from the castings, 
so it was hardly surprising that after the collapse a representative of 
the Mausley Iron Company, who made the ironwork reported that a casting 
flaw had been discovered in one of the girders ("mere honey-cake" he 
called it)? Such was the frequency with which these blowholes occurred 
that he had thought nothing of it and followed the generally accepted 
practice of. filling the-Ycavity with a mixture of iron filings and wax, 
assuming that the safety margin was sufficient to cover the loss of 
strength. 
Fig 2. Ii. "ievation of the Dee bridge (part). 
Fig 2.12. Elevation of Dee bridge girdi: ýr. 
!
Fig 2.13. Cross-section, De,? bridge. 
Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyright
-- --, ý 
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The main members of the bridge were calculated as simply supported 
cast iron girders proportioned in accordance with Hodgkinson's formula 
for the design of cast iron beams. This expression, which will 
be discussed more fully later, was deduced from experimental results 
and was supposed to apply only to conventional _L 
beams and static 
loading. No research had been done to investigate the effect of 
trussing the beam with wrought iron straps nor to assess the effect 
of varying the beam section, so the application of the design rule to 
this type of structure was fundamentally invalid. Nevertheless it was 
,, 
dot considered necessary to assess the beam and truss interaction 
(fig. 2.14)'quantitatively when the 'design was made. Indeed before the 
stiffness method of structural analysis (pioneered by Navier in his "Resum4 
des leions" in 1826) caught on in the late 1800s such work was difficult. 
As matters stood, the designer assumed that there would be a certain 
amount of beneficial composite action between the two systems and that 
the section of the cast iron could be reduced from that nominally 
-required -for- carrying- the- whole -load by bending action. -----The -extent of - _- "" 
the reduction was to make the strength of the cast iron beam only 1.55 times 
the design load instead of the more usual figure of 4 or 5. 
The beams had an inherent weakness in that they were made of 
several pieces bolted together, another move not envisaged by 
Hodgkinson. The bolt holes, especially those through the flanges must 
have reduced the strength of the beam and it is hard to believe that a 
satisfactory bearing was obtained between all the various pieces, despite 
the introduction of layers of felt along the joint lines. Furthermore, 
holes were cast in the compression flange for the positioning of 
ornamental eagles at the quarter points of each span. 
12 
Quite apart from 
weakening the flange in themselves, these were left empty, so that it 
10 
k 
Fig 2.14. Interaction of beam and trussing. 
,... _ .... _ _. ý-r 
ý 
ýýý`: 
`' 
_ý 
Fig 2.15. Frost damage, Mythe bridge. 
At A. and B. steel plates have been 
bolted onto the main arch ribs 
following local fracture due to water 
freezing in the sockets cast to receive 
the spandrel struts. 
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is quite likely that water froze in them during the only winter the 
bridge survived causing local damage to the cast iron. The author has 
noticed similar damage on other early cast iron structures, notably 
Telford's Mythe Bridge at Tewkesbury (fig. 2.15). Mention should also 
be made of the facts that the bridge abutments were built parallel to 
the flow of the river and that the railway was on a slight curve. 
The first of these matters has always been common enough practice 
although it means that one girder is loaded before the other. The 
curve of the rails added to the uneven distribution of loading on the 
'girders, introducing a centrifugal force of about 3.3 kN (75Olbsf) for 
1a 
normal train 'as well as an uneven static distribution of load. 
A common way of counteracting these effects was by bracing the main 
S 
girders firmly together, but the binding system applied to the Dee 
Bridge was flimsy and ineffective, consisting only of wrought iron ties 
dovetailed into sockets cast on the main girders. 
The train weight was modelled as a uniformly distributed load of 
33kN/m (1 ton/ft). This was usual at the time, but it was a 
dangerous practice because it did not recognise that railway loads were 
significantly different from horse drawn vehicles and herds of animals 
allowed for in the previous generations of structures. Unlike the old 
cast iron arches and aqueducts, the new bridges had to carry fast 
moving heavy locomotives along a track which in the early days was so 
primitive and so irregular that considerable impact forces were imparted 
to the structure. 
The transmission of these forces to the bridge girders was also 
unsatisfactory (fig. 2.13).. The cross-bearers that supported the 
bridge deck and the track ended in cast iron shoes resting on the 
I 
bottom flange of the main girders. This resulted in a highly 
undesirable condition of shear in the flange, and also in the development 
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of torsion in the deck, sufficient in practice to cause a 75 mm (311) de- 
flection of the girders inwards as a train passed overhead. 
4 
This outline of the Dee Bridge would not be complete if attention 
was not drawn to the fact that the structure was unusually daring, not 
only because its span was longer than any earlier examples but because 
the other geometric parameters were devised so that both cast and 
wrought iron were used exceedingly sparingly. From Table 2.2 and fig. 2.16 
' it can be seen that the girders were unusually shallow and that the sec- 
tion of the top flange was-not increased to sustain the. additional 
compression thrown upon it by the prestressing. 
_i 
depth 
d. 
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Fig 2.16. Graph of depth of girder v. spati, showing 
normal 1iI3 is of practice (SI and S2). 
9o loot. 
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2.3 The Collapse 
The ironwork of the bridge was erected in the summer of 1846 and 
one line of rails was ready for'service in September of that'year. 
This enabled the contractors to carry materials to sites further along 
the line to Holyhead, and it_is recorded that one of the earliest 
 
trains to cross the structure consisted of heavily-laden wagons drawn 
by three thirty ton locomotives. Early in October one girder casting 
was found to be cracked at one of the third-point joints, but the 
fractured metal was held together by the wrought iron trussing until 
IS 
the opening was propped and a replacement girder substituted. 
The passenger train service from Shrewsbury to Chester was 
inaugurated on October 31st and ran satisfactorily for six months. 
The Bridge behaved satisfactorily, its only noticeable deficiency being 
that it was very prone to vibration as trains crossed overhead. In 
0 
a test carried out on the intact line of rails after the collapse, 
Mr Walker and Capt. Simmons noticed that "there is a shaking and 
oscillating motion caused by an engine going at considerable speed, the 
effect of which depends on degree and is difficult of calculation, but 
is a constantly repeated force which upon a hard rigid body like a cast 
iron beam tends to weaken and injure it. In addition to this is the 
tremulous motion of the beam when the engine is going over. This 
tremor was so sensible that Capt. Simmons could not distinctly see the 
edge of the beam. " 
(6 
In May 1847 it was decided that the bridge superstructure should 
be somewhat modified to protect its timber decking from the risk of 
S 
fire started by cinders falling from the fireboxes of passing locomotives. 
During the afternoon of May 24th a permanent way gang spread a 130 mm (5") 
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layer of sandstone ballast over the decking thus increasing the 
weight supported by each pair of girders by about 25 tons. The 
work was personally inspected by Stephenson, who happened to be in 
Chester on business. 
The job was finished in time for the 6.20 pm train from Chester 
to Shrewsbury. The locomotive and its five flimsy carriages were 
travelling at about 11 m/s (25mph) as the train reached the curved line 
of rails across the bridge. The first two openings were safely 
cleared but on passing over the third span from Chester the engine 
n driver felt the rails giving beneath him. To quote from his report: - 
"We passed over two arches of the Dee Bridge without noticing 
anything unusual, but on reaching the third I felt a 'sinking'. 
Fearing something had given way I gave the engine all the 
steam I could, which caused here to jump up and break away 
from the tender. I then saw that Anderson (the stoker) was 
on the tender. He was standing on the offside, but ina 
-moment or 
two he was thrown off the engine and his head. fell. on 
the rails at the spot which the jury has viewed. As soon as 
I could stop the engine I looked back and wondered what had 
become of the train, but, supposing the bridge had fallen in, 
I proceeded to SalteneyJunction, where I beckoned some plate 
layers who were leaving work. I could not tell them what had 
taken place for I did not exactly know. " 
Alex MacGregor, whopfinished üp-in the river surrounded by the remains 
of what had been the luggage van near the rear of the train was sufficiently 
unruffled by the collapse to remember that the train did not seem to 
leave the rails before the sinking began. On crossing the bridge he 
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heard a crash and noticed an instant deflection of the carriages. 
The accident was seen by a little boy who was fishing the river 
" IB from the Wrexham bank near the bridge. Hearing a train coming he 
naturally looked ups and on its crossing the span nearest to h=ri he 
heard a crashing noise for two or three seconds and then saw the 
four carriages come down "in a string". (fig. 2.17) 
Despite the fall of 11 m (36') into the river, of the 25 people 
in the train only five were killed, miraculously few fatalities for such 
a severe accident. A further 18 were injured. A Coroner's Inquest 
was held to establish the manner in which the dead were killed, but 
because this was the first serious structural collapse on the railway 
network, the Court took on the aspect of a trial of engineering 
expertise by a hostile public. As a result its proceedings attracted 
widespread interest. The Illustrated London News, The Civil Engineer 
and Architect's Journal, Railway Chronicle, Railway Times, Railway 
Record, Herapath's Journal and Bradshaw's Railway Gazette all reported 
" the hearing 
in considerable detail, and many prominent engineers-attended---. -- 
in person. _ 
Pik 2.17. The wreck of the bridge. 
Image removed due to third party copyright
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2.4 The Inquest 
A great deal of phoney evidence was given at the Inquest by the 
various parties trying to avoid liability for the accident. The 
servants of the Chester & Holyhead Railway Company were instructed to 
propound the story that destruction of the bridge was directly 
attributable to a derailment, although the eye witness accounts already 
quoted negate this possibility. The Chester & Holyhead statements 
are. of limited value because after the verdict on the fätalities had 
been delivered at Chester, the Company's solicitor, Mr--Walker, 
confided to a friend that only legal expediency had prevented an 
admission that inadequate knowledge of structural behaviour was respon- 
. sible for the underdesign of the bridge. 
19 
It is nevertheless interes- 
ting to include a brief sketch of the Chester & Holyhead evidence to 
show how a deliberate attempt was made to twist the facts and avoid 
responsibility. 
Stephenson of course had to take a leading part in this. He 
inspected the wreckage on Thursday 27th May and immediately drew up a 
report for the Chester & Holyhead Directors 
20 
After affirming his 
faith in the trussed girder principle he described the damage and came 
to the conclusion that fracture I in fig. 2.18 ".. was precisely 
such as might be expected from a large piece of vertical rib being broken 
out of the girder and separated from the lower flange which remains 
perfect; a description of fracture which could scarcely be produced 
by a vertical action .. ý'. He then clumsily manipulated evidence 
provided-by the collapse to show that a carriage wheel had broken 
and caused a derailment resulting in either the tender or a coach hitting 
the girder at I with sufficient momentum to break out the shaded chunk 
I' 
of metal. 
0 Io 
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Fig 2.18. fractures of the broken Dee bridge girder. 
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Fig 2.19. sketch of the modifying castings fitted 
to the Dee bridge girders. 
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-------bending moment due to dead load. of bridge girder 
ý. -----bending moment due to dead load and max. trussing forces, as shown above. 
Fig 2.20. Trussing forces and loading 
distlibution, Dee bridge girder. 
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This view was confirmed by the Clerk of Works on the line when he 
gave verbal evidence at the Inquest. On June 3rd, Stephenson also had 
to speak from the witness box, and although the wreckage of the bridge 
was still in the river, 
21 
he offered new and amazingly detailed "evidence" 
to support his theory. 
He was backed up by his eminent friend Joseph Locke, 'engineer 
of the Grand Junction Railway. Locke expanded Stephenson's theory 
past all reasonable credulity as he described the course he considered 
the tender to have taken across the doomed span. 
22" 
1 
Stephenson also produced a model to illustrate the trussed girder 
principle. This made the bridge look much sounder than it actually was, 
and his explanation seems to have been deliberately calculated to 
mislead the amateur jut-y. 
2.3 ".. It has been said that the links did not 
aid in sustaining the rigid fabric. That opinion was submitted to me 
twelve months ago. I. have considered the objection and. caused. _ 
experiments to be made. The result is conclusive that wrought iron 
links are both effective and act in concert. Even so the structure 
has been varied to meet this objection. " He then explained the principle 
from a model held in his hand. "The weight of the girder causes a 
deflection of two inches (50mm), but the suspenders can be screwed up 
to bend it two inches upward. In this state the whole weight passing 
over the bridge is placed on the suspenders and the wrought iron really 
takes the place of the cast iron girder. This is what I mostly rely on ... 
Nevertheless the pair of girders are capable of carrying 280 tons (2.8. MN) 
of dead weight spread over the whole of the platform. The' greatest 
weight that can possibly be run over the bridge by railway traffic is 
170 tons (1.7 MN), but this is an extreme case. There are clearly 
100 tons (1.0 MN) to spare, treating the bridge as a pure girder bridge 
without suspenders ... The wrought 
iron links are capable of sustaining 
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129 tons (1.29 MN) uniformly distributed over the bridge, and double 
that for the whole system of castings and ironwork for one railway. 
The two principles can not be brought into strict union at one and the 
same time but they may mutually aid each other ... I have erected in 
-. - 20 years more iron bridges than any other member of the Profession. 
... and I have always acted on Hodgkinson's experiments. " 
/ 
t, 
This is confusing for listener and reader alike, as indeed it 
was intended to be. Fortunately the members of the Chester Jury 
were not misled by this nor the tales of deficient masonry, sudden 
subsidence and unequal coefficients of expansion of cast and. wrought 
iron. They took more notice of Messrs. Walker and Simmons, the two 
engineers sent by the Commissioners of Railways to investigate the 
accident. These experts said that they were not convinced by Stephenson's 
demonstration and stated that in their opinion it was very difficult 
to ensure composite action betwen the cast and-wrought iron girders 
They said-that the cast iron should have been strong enough in itself 
to carry the whole load with a minimum safety factor of three in place 
ý5 
of the value adopted (1.55). Their view was that the cause of the 
collapse was fatigue"of the metal. To use their own words, "When a 
weight, partly permanent and partly passing but together forming a very. ' 
considerable proportion of the breaking weight of the girder is in continued 
operation, fiat girders of cast iron suffer injury, and their strength 
becomes reduced. " 
26 
Consequently when the pompous foreman of the Jury, Sir Ernest 
Walker was called on by the Coroner to return a verdict it -was obvious 
that the fundamental message had been driven well home: 
"We find, " he said, "that George Roberts, John Matthews and Charles 
Nesbitt were accidentally killed on the evening of the 24th of May last, 
in the Parish of St Mary_onthe Hill, _in_the_City of 
Chester. 
_bv_beina 
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precipitated along with a train of carriages on the bed or bank of 
the River Dee, from the breakage of one of the 12 cast iron girders 
constituting the Railway Bridge over that River. We find also that 
Isaac Powis died on the 26th of May aforesaid from injuries-he received 
at the same time and place and from the like cause; and we find 
that Thomas Anderson came by his death on the 24th of May aforesaid, by 
being accidentally thrown from the tender onto the rails. We are further 
unanimously of the opinion that the girder did not break from any 
lateral blow of the engine, tender, 'carriage or van, or from any fault 
or defect in the masonry of the piers or abutments; but from its being 
made of a strength insufficient to bear the pressure of quick trains' 
passing over it. We feel that the eleven remaining girders, having 
been cast from the same pattern and of the same strength, are equally 
weak, and consequently equally dangerous for quick or passenger trains 
as was the broken one. We consider we should not be doing our duty 
towards the public if we separated without expressing our unanimous opinion 
that no girder bridge of so brittle and treacherous a metal as cast 
iron alone, even though trussed with wrought iron rods, is safe for 
quick or passenger trains; and we have it in evidence before us, that 
there are upward of 100 bridges similar in principle or form to the late 
one over the River Dee, either in use or in' the course of being constructed 
on various lines of railways. We consider all of these unsafe, more -, 
or less in proportion to the span; still, all unsafe. We therefore 
call upon Her Majesty's Government to institute such an enquiry into 
the merits or demerits of these bridges, as shall either condemn the 
principle or establish their safety to such a degree that passengers may 
rest fully satisfied there is no danger ... " 
The Coroner said that only the portion of the verdict which related 
to the death of the victims was acceptable as a verdict. He did 
however undertake to forward their other recommendations to the Railway 
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Department of the Government. This resulted in the survey of iron 
railway bridges previously alluded to. The Board of Trade sent a 
circular to each Railway Company asking for full details of all iron 
structures, and as the replies were received it became appaxtent that 
there were many anomalies in contemporary practice. 
2: 1 
These, together 
with Mr Walker's and Capt. Simmons' report on the Dee Bridge accident 
led to the setting up of a"Royal Commission appointed to Inquire into 
the Application of Iron to Railway Structures" (Aug. 27,1847). 
The Commissioners' report published in 1849 revealed much about the state 
of engineering practice and theory and added considerably to them, the 
most notable contr-itution being Hodgkinson's-investigation*ý; f"the " 
fatigue characteristics of cast and wrought iron bars and beams. The 
Report also revealed a need for properly organised engineering education 
änd research, and it thereby stimulated the setting up of University 
and other schools of engineering. 
To round off this picture of the events directly related to the 
Dee Bridge collapse, it is worth noting the subsequent history of the 
trussed girder. 
After the-failure, public opinion demanded that both the rebuilt 
structure and other bridges of the same type should be strengthened. 
Some engineers realised that the original idea of the trussed girders 
was unsound and favoured rebuilding rather than tacking on strengthening 
material.. 
In fact a compromise solution was applied between these extremes, 
i. e. the bridges were visibly strengthened to allay immediate public 
anxiety, but were replaced at the earliest possible 
opportunity. A diary of the life of the Dee Bridge is broadly typical 
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of the history of many of these bridges after 1847: - 
25.5.1847 Failure of the Dee Bridge 
24.6.1847 Undamaged spans supported on timber centering 
July 1847 Capt. Simmons inspected the structure and allowed it to 
reopen, subject to a speed restriction. 
11.8.1847 Cost of the temporary support given as £1,000. 
Sept. 1847 £12,727 paid by the Chester & Holyhead Railway in 
compensation for injury and death. 
6.10.1847 *Stephenson reported a test on one of the undamaged girders, 
which failed at a lower load than anticipated. " 
." 
23.3.1848 As a witness before the Royal Commission, Stephenson 
explained how he had strengthened the Dee Bridge (fig. 2.19). 
The unsightly castings A&B were removed and replaced 
by pieces D&E. 11 
1848 After the collapse, no new trussed cast-iron girders were 
designed by Stephenson or anyone else. 
1853 Stephenson, writing in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
explained why he abandoned the trussed girder30 "The 
objection to this girder is common to all girders in which 
two independent systems are attempted to be blended; and 
as a general principle all such arrangements should be 
avoided. It is useless to say more on the subject of 
this form of girder as, since the adoption of wrought 
iron for girders they have been entirely superceded. 
They were designed when no other means existed of 
obtaining iron girders of great span, and the melancholy 
accident which occurred at Chester is the only existing 
instance of their failure. " 
1870-71 The Dee Bridge was replaced by wrought iron trusses, 
supplied and erected by Woodhall's of Dudley. 
C 
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2.5. The Real Cause of the Accident 
Having established a valid cause for the accident, the. subject 
might be considered closed were it not for some further evidence, over- 
looked at the Inquest, which suggests that there was also something 
very unusual about the actual mode of collapse, which lay quite 
outside the experience of all but a few of the contemporary 
designers. 
The line taken by Walker and Simmons was that repeated cycles 
of loading led to a fatigue failure by some unspecified mechanism but 
probably by a straightforward compression or tension failure of one of 
the flanges. This view was corroborated by other engineers present at 
Chester. 
However, a modern observer would say that the beam would probably 
buckle out of its vertical plane at a lower load than that required for 
"failure by one or other of these modes. Since this wodld give further 
weight to the idea that the collapse fits the pattern of development 
whereby a design principle is extrapolated from its original boundary 
conditions for use in applications of such size that other failure 
criteria apply, the notion merits further investigation. 
Firstly the modern hypothesis must be tested by reference to what 
the contemporary observers saw but failed to understand. It is found 
that at the Chester Inquest there were hints that one or two people 
appreciated thata buckling mechanism might have been responsible for 
the failure. Mr Kennedy, partner in the Liverpool firm of ironmasters 
Bury and Kennedy said that "In experimenting upon beams, I have found 
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that when the sectional area of the upper rib was too small to 
stand the compression put upon it, similar fractures have been made 
as the triangular one in this girder, which have been sprang out" 
31 
(see fig. 2. . 18) 
Henry Robertson, engineer to the Shrewsbury & Chester Railway 
Company, reinforced this view by suggesting that the compression in the 
upper flange was actually increased by the wrought iron rods, thus 
increasing the susceptibility to buckling; "The fracture ... I consider 
" to have resulted from the weakness of the top flange which was compressed 
and broken by the strain-arising from the rolling weight of the engine 
and tender, and the vibratory motion of the structure itself ... This 
compression is remarkably evident by the bulging out of the metal at 
the point of the parting at the top of the web ... In estimating the strength 
of the girder, I am of the opinion that the tension rods, from the form 
of the section of the girder, weakened it, and threw an undue strain by 
compression on the top flange ... 11 
Stephenson probably grasped the significance of what was said, 
although the Jury missed it. As a result he had one of the remaining 
girders tested after the accident. This failed at a static load of 
38 tons, far below the 140 tons the designer envisaged as the minimum 
3L " it should carry. This was proof enough that. there was something 
unusual about the action of the beams, especially as the broken pieces 
were found to be free from casting flaws. 
Suddenly Stephenson comprehended the truth, which was that as 
Robertson had suggested, the wrought iron links did work against the beam 
action of the cast iron. When he was called before the Royal 
ýý 
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Commission in 1848 he explained that he could now see that, "The fulcrum 
was below the line of thrust, and increased the tension of the bottom 
and correspondingly increased the compression of the top by adding to 
33 
it ... ", but' even at this stage he does not seem to have realised 
that this would lead to a buckling mechanism rather than the simple 
compression or tension fracture predicted by Hodgkinson. 
For the sake of clarifying the issue, the author reanalysed the 
girder along modern lines to see if the breaking load for a buckling 
mechanism would be lower than that required for a simple compression or 
tension failure. Fig. 2.20 shows the possible adjustments of the beam 
t 
truss system and indicates the forces induced by tensioning. In a 
situation such as this with a small angle of inclination for the 
wrought iron rods, quite considerable horizontal forces can be induced 
by relatively little prestressing. This not only brings an undesirable 
addition to the bending moments in the end portions of the beam, but 
it also increases the compression forces in the top flange, as suggested 
by Robertson. The loading distribution that probably existed in the 
two systems is shown in fig. 2.20, and under these conditions the beam 
would have a factor of safety against lateral buckling approximately 
equal to one as -a train passed-overhead. -It. is-therefore not -surprising-- -'-- 
that the bridge collapsed. The failure probably began with the quarter 
point fracture along the line of weakness created by the holes cast in 
the compression flange for the proposed ornaments. Whereas with a 
fracture initiated in the middle third the wrought iron strapping might 
have saved the bridge, it could do nothing to prevent this type of 
failure being catastrophic (fig. 2.21). The onset of this mode of 
collapse would be aggravated by the manner in which the train and 
deck loads were transmitted to the girders with a twisting component. 
The Dee Bridge was more susceptible to this type of buckling failure 
ý. 
_---= 
Fig 2.21. Inability of tension rods ,o rrevent 
failure in the ''a 
trussed girder. 
Fig 2.22. Trussed girder with tic-cacks. 
(Engineer, J. HIa'ikshaw. ) 
Image removed due to third party copyright
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than earlier structures because of the tensioning of the rods. 
Another unfavourable feature was the lack of continuous ties from 
span to span which Stephenson and others had used in earlier structures 
such as the'R. Ouse Bridge at York and the Rye House Bridge. on the 
Eastern Counties Railway (Table 2.2. and fig. 2.22). 
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2.6. 'The Accident and Contemporary Practice 
r 
The rear cause of the accident was outside the everyday 
experience of most of the contemporary engineers. Those who spoke 
at the Inquest seem to have been more or less completely unaware that 
anything had been done which required more data than that supplied by 
Hodgkinson's formula. Only Kennedy referred to some model experiments 
where beams with a small upper flange had failed by buckling. 
Similar attitudes prevailed at a discussion held at the 1- 
Institiition of Civil Engineers in April 1847, just one month before the 
Dee Bridge collapse 
3' 
This meeting was convened following the 
failure of a trussed girder in a Manchester Cotton mill (fig. 2.23) and 
several leading engineers attended. A descriptive paper was read by 
William Fairbairn and Messrs Farey, Bidder, Vignoles and Stephenson 
spoke in the discussion. 
Some very odd statements were made and an impartial observer 
would have seen that so many different opinions could only conceal a 
general lack of understanding. --Unfortunately there was no formal "^ 
mechanism for summarising ä discussion in this way, although such a 
conclusion might just conceivably have led to a reappraisal in time 
to save the Dee Bridge. 
The beam in the mill was loaded in two distinct ways. Floor 
loads (including a component from vibrating machinery) were transmitted 
from the upper storey tw"fhe lower flange via shallow brick arches 
and with scant regard for shearing action (fig. 2.24). Roof loads 
passed down the column A into the beam via a saddle resting on the com- 
pression flange. The stress in the column varied as the water 
level'in 
the`roof reservoir rose- and fell. __ 
Fig 2.23. 
Fig 2.23. Trussed. gi? rder in Messrs Gray Cotton mi? 1, Manchester. 
Fig 2. 
`` 
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Fig 2.24 
Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyright
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Discussion of the collapse dealt mainly with the action of the 
wrought iron ties and the mechanism of failure. Fairbairn gave 
a figure for the amount of load that would be taken by the trussing, 
. 
but it is highly unlikely that this was founded on mathematical 
35 
reasoning because he was notoriously bad at even the simplest calculations, 
Other easily verified mistakes in the paper corroborate this view - for 
example there is an incorrect statement about the distribution of roof 
loads and an estimate of the beam strength based on Hodgkinson's 
formula which is immediately contradicted by a remark that the beam 
probably buckled. 
Stephenson agreed with Fairbairn, but did not quantify the 
distribution of load between beam and trussing? 
' 
He made the mistake 
of assuming that the ties could be applied withöut increasing the 
-size of the compression flange required for an unassisted beam. 
Other engineers thought the trussing was principally useful in 
preventing total collapse in the event of the cast iron fracturing in 
the tension zone (fig. 2.9). This was true in the earliest structures 
where the trussing was so flimsy as to be insufficient to do more than 
hold the cast iron parts together after a fracture. Messrs Bidder and 
Vignoles, two engineers who built some of the first trussed girder 
bridges were among those who supported this idea. 
John Farey, an engineer celebrated in his own day for his 
inventiveness and for his work on steam engines in particular1 set himself 
against the formidable proponents of-these opposing views. He saw 
precisely what was wrong with the beam and his remarks could have been 
equally well applied to any trussed girder with ties ending above the 
'_ 38 
neutral axis of the cast iron beam. To use his own words, "The upper 
---- ---- ,ý -- - ----- ---- - 
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flange of the lower iron beam was obviously deficient in width to 
render it secure against lateral deviation from its horizontal straight 
line. the wrought iron truss rods which were applied to each side of 
the cast iron beams would have the effect of resolving part-of the 
downward pressure exerted by the vertical column, into a force of 
compression acting in the-direction of the length of the cast iron 
beam ... ". Furthermore he could see how this could 
lead to failure 
even if he could not calculate the buckling load: ... The thin 
upper edge would be likely to be crushed, and to yield laterally to the 
compression caused by the-action of the truss rods ... rr. 
Later he pointed out that this type of failure was specially 
likely in this case because the roof load was transmitted onto a 
saddle resting on the top flange of the trussed beam. Any 
imperfections in the straightness of this flange would diminish the 
strength of the girder still further. 
The issues raised by the contradictory views expressed in the 
discussion were not taken up because no one had a statutory duty to 
make an investigation. Most of the engineers mentioned above were 
engaged in the frenzied activity of railway building that gripped 
Britain in the late 1840s, and had very little time for researching. 
" 
No establishments existed to undertake specialised studies, and only a 
few men like Eaton Hodgkinson worked solely on engineering problems. 
The Government of the day had no power to control the practices 
adopted by engineers, and even if it had it would have been very unlikely 
to detect dangerous pr 
dedüres because of the amount of work going on. 
Nevertheless the fact that cannot be denied is that there was no 
unanimous opinion about the cause of the collapse. This pinpointed the 
---. -- 
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need for some provision to be made to stimulate and assist research 
even before the tragic circumstances of the Dee Bridge accident made 
the work imperative. 
a 1 
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2.7 The Accident in Perspective 
Perhaps pressure of work is an excuse which lets Government and 
engineers off their responsibility for the Dee Bridge collapse too 
lightly, because after all when the accident had occurred a 
thoroughly efficient Royal Commission was set up extremely quickly, which 
called on nearly all the leading expertise for information related to 
its investigations. Brunel, Stephenson, Locke, the Barlows, the Cubitts, 
Fairbairn, Fox and Raistrick all gave evidence and dist-inguished 
academics such as Stokes and Hodgkinson conducted experiments. 
1 
Since these engineers coul find time for research and discussion 
when they considered it necessary, the view that the successful 
accomplishment of much railway work had made them complacent about their 
practices seems reasonable. The use of Hodgkinson's beam formula 
illustrates this point. This rule was published in 1835 and was supposed 
to give an estimate of the failure load for a centrally loaded simply 
supported cast iron beam. 
9 
From tests on models up1to 3m long Hodgkinson deduced that 
W= centrally applied breaking load (tons) 
Ab= area of the bottom flange (in2) 
W=c. Ab. d. d= depth of the beam (in) 
1= length of span _ 
(in) 
C= casting 
25 for beams cast lying on their side 
constant 26 for beams cast erect. (ton/in2) 
/ 
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No area was specified for the upper flange but later work established 
that for an economical section the area of the tension flange should 
be 6 times that of the compression flange, the difference in size being 
a reflection of the permissible stresses in tension and compression 
re. sutlting from the notorious unreliability of cast iron in tension. 
In millwork potential instability was counteracted by the manner in which 
loads were transmitted to the girders (fig. 2.24) but in bridges, where 
rather differentcconditions applied and where the beams were often 
loaded eccentrically (fig. 2.13) designers did not always see that it 
was desirable to provide additional material in the compression flange. 
1' 
Certain other factors made real beams less strong than they should 
have been. Designers often assumed that a uniformly distributed load 
had the same effect as a central point load of half the total magnitude, 
but of course this practice under estimated the total magnitude of ben- 
ding stresses. Another and more important underestimate of strength 
arose from the fact that whereas the models could, be made more or less 
free from casting imperfections, real beams, and especially the longest 
girders, could never be made absolutely straight or free from a certain 
variability of texture caused by uneven cooling in 1h e moulds. It is 
significant that Simmons observed in his report on the Dee accident that 
one of the girders had a distortion of 75 mm ( 3") from the straight 
line. 
44 
The addition of trussing rods was not envisaged by Hodgkinson 
2 
during the initial studies 
Y 
As has been mentioned, when they were first 
introduced the idea was merely to safeguard the main beams from brittle 
fracture, but in later work Stephenson and others tried to use them for 
prestressing. 
43) 
* This would have been a good idea if the ties had been 
0 
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kept below the neutral axis of the beam, but in practice neither the 
positioning of the rods nor the size of compression flange required 
was properly studied. The use of a three link system physically 
connected to the cast iron gidrers at the third points of the span 
was another anomalous feature of the design as adapted for prestressing. 
Here there was insufficient provision for movement at the connection, so 
no forces could develop in the horizontal links. After the Dee Bridge 
accident, Stephenson very soon realised his mistakes and modified the 
works he had in hand to fulfil these conditions (figs. 2.25 & 2.26). 
Taken together these remarks suggest that a continuous review of 
the development of trussed girders might have forestalled the disaster 
situation in which design information was applied outside the range of 
its validity. For example, a note of the basis of Hodgkinson's formula 
circulated among designers with a brief history of its application to 
trussed girder bridges would have shown that the original conditions 
(static loads on small beams) were very different from the railway loads 
and composite action of the latest bridges. 
Better still, a graphical and tabular demonstration of the use of 
the basic design parameters such as that collected from contemporary 
sources and presented in table 2.2 and figs. 2: 16 and 2.27 would have 
given a clear and quantitative indication of how far the original data 
had been extrapolated and a rational assessment of the risk being taken 
in pushing development still further. 
Take, for example, the use of Hodgkinson's formula. Using the 
assumption made by the early railway engineers that the dead and live 
loads together constituted a uniformly distributed load, q, of about 
1-1.5 tons/foot run, the total load carried by each girder of an 
Fi. 2.25. River Ombrone railway bridge. 
Fig 2.26. River Arno rail-,,,, %y bridge. 
Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyright
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ordinary bridge (span L) would be Z. q. L. Since for normal purposes 
a uniform load could apparently be taken as generating the same bending 
forces as a central point load of half the total magnitude, the 
equivalent central breaking weight for such a beam would be'W = q. L = cAbd 
4L 
from Hodgkinson's formula. It would therefore be reasonable to suppose 
from the initial assumption that = Ab d= constant, i. e. that there 
4c LZ 
would be a linear relationship between Abd and L2 for the range of 
spans considered. If these quantities are plotted from Table 2.2, it 
can be seen that Stephenson's bridges at Chester and Stockton were 
seriously understrength in terms of contemporary practice (fig. 2.27 - the 
various lines represent different safety margins). The Chester bridge 
of course collapsed, "and a search of Stephenson's correspondence shows 
that after the accident he was very worried about the security of the 
bridge at Stockton 
45 
This weakness could, however, have been detected 
if a continuous record of changes in current design parameters had 
been kept. The fact that most of the bridges in table 2.2. 
were constructed between 1844 and 1847 pinpoints the need to up date 
such a record regularly. 
Unfortunately this information was not available in contemporary 
books or periodicals. In fact the statistics that have been collected 
were largely derived from the survey of iron bridges carried out by the 
Commissioners of Railways immediately after the Dee Bridge collapse, 
which demonstrates the feasibility of carrying out such a survey even 
at a time of enormous pressure of work. Of the 226 Railway Companies 
circulated with a letter asking for details of iron bridges on their lines 
163 replies were received presenting a fascinating picture of railway 
practice at the time. Table 2.1 is a general breakdown of the statistics 
giving a perspebtive view, not available before the accident, of the 
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iron railway bridges constructed throughout the country, while 
Table 2.2. contains rather more detailed information about trussed cast 
iron girders.. From'Table 2.1 it is clear that most engineers 
considered the trussed girder unsuitable for spans greater than 20 m (70 ft), 
thr, preferred alternatives being cast iron arches, bow and string 
girders, and tubular girders on the Fairbairn pattern. Lattice and 
truss girders, later to become the dominant form for spans of 25-60 m 
(80-200 ft) had hardly been applied at all by this date. The main lesson 
to be drawn from this table is that if Stephenson had been faced with 
this body of opinion at the time of the design, he might have been 
more careful about his extrapolation of the trussed girder principle. 
Enough has now been said to show that in engineering terms the 
collapse of the Dee Bridge was not 1just a chance occurrence. but 
the natural outcome of a period of change and development. It is also 
interesting to try and quantify the total effect of neglecting the 
research function during the years of railway development up to 1847. 
This affected not only the trussed girder bridges, but also all the 
under-line structures in which the fundamentally unsuitable cast iron 
material was used. 
Broadly speaking, the history of the Dee Bridge after the collapse 
was repeated with all the other sixty odd trussed girders already built 
or under construction. These were strengthened, usually by bolting 
additional pieces on to the original castings (fig 2.28). This 
gave an outward appearance of solidity, but in reality it must have 
been very difficult to obtain an accurate fit and even bearing for the 
new pieces. Engineers obviously realised that this was only a face saving 
0 
Fig 2.28. Compound trussed girder 
with strengthened compression flange. 
Fig 2.29. Chepstow bridge, I. K. Brunel, 
engineer. 
,r :r 
Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyright
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measure because apart from the much larger scale Chepstow railway 
bridge built by IK Brunel in 1852 (fig 2.29) no new structures using 
the principle were designed. As soon as railway loads begap to 
increase with the development of heavier locomotives the opportunity was 
taken to remove many of the old structures and replace them with some- 
thing more satisfactory. 
Some idea of the cost of replacing these indifferent structures 
can be derived from information given by GD Dempsey in his contemporary 
essay. 
' Writing in about 1850 he said that the cost of ironwork for 
an 18.3 m (60') trussed girder was ¬1,500. This means that the absolute 
minimum cost of replacing all sixty trussed girder bridges must have 
been X90-100,000 at 1850s prices. Temporary closures, propping and 
4-strengthening 
probably more than doubled this. 
ý 
'r 
Table 2.1 shows that at the time of the Dee Bridge collapse there 
was a total of some 1,400 cast iron railway bridges in service. 
Many of these were replaced within a few years by one of the wrought 
iron forms developed after the publication of the Royal Commission report 
in 1849-had pointed out some of the deficiencies of cast iron. Taking 
this into account the final bill for neglecting research during the 
early part of the railway age can fairly be said to be about £1.5 m from 
this source alone. 
Mention was made earlier of the fact that at the time of the Dee 
Bridge collapse' engineering work on new railways was being carried out 
on an unprecedented scale. It is interesting to look a little more 
closely at this so-called railway mania to see how the whole climate 
in which work was carried out may have affected the adoption of trussed 
girder and other cast iron structures for railway purposes. 
"ir 
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To turn back a few years, in the 1830s a great deal of engineering 
work was successfully accomplished, financed by the solid capital of 
the towns and industries that were the principal beneficiaries of the 
lines constructed. Many of these were built on a truly monumental 
scale - the Great Western main line from London to Bristol being the 
best example, but there were others including the Liverpool-Manchester 
and London-Birmingham Railways. The cost of these projects was 
enormous, and to start with investors found that the return on their 
capital was very poor indeed. This was partly their own fault because 
" the fares charged frequently reflected the capital invested and were 
consequently very high, but there were other. factors as well, such as an 
acute trade recession. 
As a result, when the 184Os opened railways were regarded as a 
poor investment and no new lines were proposed between 1840 and 1842. 
The economic, stagnation lasted through these years but at the beginning 
of 1843 prospects began to look a good deal healthier. Railway 
business became more attractive because fares had'been reduced, and 
because some of the excesses of surplus manpower and unnecessarily lavish 
equipment had been pruned-away during the years of austerity. 
However, the principal factor that led to a sudden revival of 
railway building was that a lot of investment capital, formerly diverted 
to a miscellany of overseas interests suddenly became available in the 
City. At the beginning of 1844 there were only 3280 km (2056 miles) 
of railway in Britain with another 640 km (400 miles) under construction, 
but as interest in railway shares caught on in the investment world appli- 
cations for new lines poured in from capitalists and speculators alike 
so that at the beginning of the Parliamentary session the Government 
suddenly found 1440 km (900 miles) of proposals awaiting its consideration. 
If this was not enough, the Board of Trade steered a bill through 
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Parliament'reducing the capital necessarily deposited before construction 
of a railway could commence from ten to five percent. The idea of the 
bill was to encourage construction work and reduce the widespread 
unemployment associated with the recession. 
The new lines had a variety of purposes. Although most large 
towns had a railway before 1944, there were many useful journeys that 
could only be accomplished by roundabout routes, so some of the new lines 
provided direct connections. Other railways were projected to connect 
outlying ports to the system. Among these was the Chester & Holyhead 
line which connected an existing main line from London with the shipping 
port for Ireland. 
In 1845 the railway situation ran wild; people could see that a 
stake in what was emerging as the dominent form of transport was an 
excellent investment so there was a rush to buy shares even at a premium. 
Many new lines were projected, and gullible folk were often induced 
to buy stakes in schemes regardless of the traffic usefulness or 
constructional difficulties of their railway. During the year Parliament 
granted powers to construct, 4600 km (2880 miles) of new line at an expen- 
diture of £44m. 
The mania continued throughout 1846, and the Government sanctioned 
£120m of applications. out of a total of £389m. Some of these were 
sound but others were justified on very shaky evidence. For example, 
some line s paralleling existing railways were authorised merely to 
allow the public the supposed benefit of unrestricted competition. 
These were dizzy manipulations of finance, frequently unrelated 
to the needs of the country as a whole. There were repercussions 
everywhere, and'very naturally these were felt in the Civil Engineering 
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industry as strongly as anywhere else. The fact that there was 
very little work available for railway engineers between 1838 and 1843 
meant that even consulting practices as famous as Robert Stephenson's 
at 24 Great'George Street found themselves seriously lacking in trained 
assistants when the rush began. These firms were extremely overworked, 
and to make matters worse their senior staff were diverted from design 
work to the tedious business of preparing and presenting interminable 
evidence to Parliamentary Committees. 
The volume of work undertaken by these men, committees and 
engineers aloke, was quite staggering and took its toll on the quality 
of intellectual judgements. Committees authorised futile schemes and 
engineers had no time to optimise and check each design systematically. 
Under these circumstances errors such as the misuse of cast iron were 
bound to occur. 
1 
This was a very trying background for the engineers to work 
against, so the question that naturally Frises is whether the railway 
mania could have been averted. The answer, as in other similar d rcum- 
stamces, is yes it could, but it was not because it was more expedient 
for the financial and political interests to let it happen. An-4 "rý 
unrepeatable opportunity for creating a railway policy was missed 
in the early 1840's, and when, in 1844, a proposal eventually came 
outlining the principles of a nationalised rail system it really came too 
late. The measure met with bitter opposition in Parliament (reflecting 
the vested interests of members) which might not have been the case had 
it happened in the years when existing Railway Companies were facing 
serious problems. 
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2.8 Summary & Conclusions 
This chapter can best be summarised by setting out the key 
facts relating to the Dee Bridge collapse in chronological order. 
First among these was the design principle applied to the main girders. 
This rule, known as Hodgkinson's formula, was devised in about 1830 
to rationalise the design of simply supported cast iron beams loaded 
with a statically applied weight-at mid span. It was widely used for 
proportioning girders in ironframed mills and factories which required 
spans'of up to 10 m. In these structures the loading was usually 
applied symmetrically and in such a way as to stabilise the girders. 
The rule was nett applied to the design of built up beams and 
trussed girders where the span required was greater than could be obtained 
with a single casting. These girders were then introduced into railway 
bridges where a different class of loads had to be carried in a less 
satisfactory manner. In the earliest crossings designers played safe 
and treated the trussing as a safety mechanism only. The success 
and economy of these bridges led them-to experiment with longer spans 
J 
and latterly with an empirically devised type of pre-stressing but by 
this time the structures being built were very distant relatives of the 
type of girders originally envisaged by Hodgkinson. Nevertheless the 
same principle was applied. 
The discussion that followed the collapse of a girder in a 
Manchester cotton mill showed that most designers did not realise that 
the principle had been extended in such a way as to render*it invalid. 
Had this discussion been satisfactorily interpreted with reference to 
the original design data, or had there been a continuous review of - 
developments such as that made immediately after the accident the trussed 
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girder principle and even the whole usage of cast iron might have 
been questioned in time to save the Dee Bridge. 
. 
As things turned out the situation had to be remedied in the 
unfavourable circumstances of a pt' lic panic. A Royal Commission was 
hastily set up to investigate the problems and find practical solutions. 
ý" This it did, in a meritorious if not all-embracing fashion, by conducting 
inquiries and by testing hypotheses with experiments. 
After publication of the 1849 Report, the fuss died down and the 
matter slowly faded from memory. This however left some--of--the basic 
issues still undiscussed, notably the fact that something should have 
been done to prevent a recurrence of the-situation whereby a period of 
unnoticed change and extrapolation led to a disaster. As will be 
shown, this has happened several times since the events of 1847. 
In this case, to have broken the train of development-before it 
resulted in a failure would have required the presentation of data 
such as that shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and fig. 2.27 to designers as 
a background against which to take risks. 
4 
This can be pointed out in retrospect, but against the highly 
unsatisfactory economic conditions governing civil engineering work in 
the 1840s it was impractical to collect such data until a disaster made 
it imperative, especially as practically no-one was willing or able to 
carry out the necessary research. 
. 
'.; ". , .. -. 
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3. The Tay Bridge 0 
3.1 History of the Undertaking 
1 
The theme running through these studies is that it should be 
impossible for any engineer to execute new work which goes outside the 
intended scope of the data and principles on which it is based. About 
thirty years after the drama of the Dee Bridge accident, the history 
of Sir Thomas Bouch's Tay Bridge provides another example of how a 
large and daring structure was built using design information which, 
J 
although it had proved adequate for earlier smaller scale designs, was 
wholly insufficient f(; r the design of a much larger project. 
The bridge in question was the first really long. high-level crossing- 
of a storm lashed estuary , 
(fig. 3.1). The single track main line of the 
North British Railway was carried on a wrought iron superstructure 3.2 km 
long which reached a maximum height of 27 m above the water. There 
were 85 truss spans varying in length from 8. to 75 m; depth/span ratio 
was about } and the width 3.8 m. The piers were of various types but 
groups of cast iron columns crudely braced with wrought iron predominated. 
Below water level these were carried down to the estuary floor via a 
masonry substructure. The total cost was £350,000 compared with 
' £217,000 estimated in 1871 just before construction began. 
The whole seven year construction period was dogged with every 
kind of difficulty. - 
As with so many cut price projects the optimism 
of the initial proposals was not borne out in practice. 
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For example, although rock was believed to exist just below the 
sand layer on the estuary floor, it was soon found that the seemingly 
solid material was nothing more than a thin crust of conglomerates covering 
an indeterminate depth of mud and clay. This led to a decision to 
reduce the. weight of the structure by abandoning the masonry towers 
originally intended in favour of cast/wrought iron substitutes. 
However, the underwater part of the piers was not altered, so the iron- 
work had to made do with the very restricted base area available. 
This gave the bridge a rather top heavy appearance. (fig. 3.1). 
On the contracting side matters were worse still. The original 
contractor, Charles de Bergue, died in the spring of 1873, and his 
heirs asked to be relieved of the contract, but not before it had been 
. 
discovered that the tender price was-hopelessly unrealistic, presumably 
because de Bergue had desperately needed the work. His firm was replaced 
by Hopkins, Gilkes and Company of Middlesborough, who fell into 
the trap of trying to save money by using poor quality materials. 
_ 
If they had been able to do this satisfactorily, the total saving on 
such an enormous structure would have been very great, but unfortunately the 
iron ore they used from mines at Cleveland was so-poor and so full of 
impurities that it was well nigh impossible to make decent quality 
castings from it. Thus a lot of the ironwork in the piers bore little 
relation to the designs (the wrought iron for the spans was manufactured 
much more satisfactorily at Middlesborough). Matters were made. still 
wprse by the near intolerable working conditions in the specially built 
foundry at Wormit on the south side of the estuary, so all in all it is 
hardly surprising that the column castings were often of 'Very uneven 
thickness and full of blowholes and cracks. The metal was so difficult 
to work that details such as bolt holes and lugs cast integrally with 
the columns were farely formed accurately and 'cold shuts' (castings in 
- which some of the metal sets before molten iron from a different route 
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through the mould joins it) were not uncommon. Unfortunately, none 
of these matters came to light until after the accident, because there 
was no"adequate provision for quality control during the construction 
period; indeed none of the supervisory staff had any experience of 
foundry work. 
The bridge was inspected and passed fit for traffic in February 
1878, and was officially opened on May 31st. Queen Victoria crossed it, 
Bouch was knighted, trains plied to and fro, and the North British 
Railway Company at last began to make money out of the undertaking. 
-However, no proper provision was made for maintenance and the inex- 
perienced men retained to look after it made little or nothing of the 
excessive vibration of the metalwork and the considerable numbers of 
nuts, bolts and rivets that they found on the structure from time to 
time. One or two badly cracked columns were strapped with iron collars, 
and some bracing members were tightened with crude, wedges, but by and 
large the structure was regarded as a success and was not unduly 
tampered with. 
However, after nineteen months of successful operation the bridge 
came to an untimely end. On the night of December 28th, 1879, a 
severe, gale blew down the estuary perpendicular to the bridge. The 
intensity increased towards 7 pm but no one thought of suspending 
traffic. At 7.13 a north bound train moved out across the estuary 
but on reaching the highest and most exposed of the through spans the 
wind blew it and a considerable portion of the bridge into the foaming 
waters below. 
a 
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2.2 The Wind Loading Problem 
A Court of Inquiry investigated the accident, and heard a great 
deal of evidence which uncovered the many defects of design and 
- construction alluded to above. Some of the discoveries were so 
dramatic that they eclipsed the main issue, namely that even if 
everything else about the bridge had been perfect, it would still have 
been inadequate to resist wind forces. 
Now whereas the many-malpractices and inadequacies of the 
construction and maintenance period have been retold and discussed 
time and again, 
1,2 
the important matter of wind loads has never 
previously been fully researched. This chapter therefore sets out 
to discover whether the designer was really to blame for not providing 
adequate bracing for the structure. 
It turns out that although some engineers had developed an 
empirical knowledge of-wind forces by the early 1870s, there was no 
generally accepted scientific method for estimating the wind loads 
likely to be encountered. In this instance the chief engineer believed 
(or was led to believe)-that wind pressure would not generate significant 
forces in the structure. lie applied for information to a recognised 
authority on the subject and received an unfortunately worded reply, 
which, instead of presenting a clear picture of the limitations of 
existing knowledge, concealed many uncertainties and inaccuracies. 
The underlying problem was that it was very difficult- to assess 
the effect of wind on süctüres'and particularly reticulated structures 
before the use of wind tunnel models was pioneered at the end of the 
nineteenth century. As a result, wind loading calculations were not 
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6 
normally carried out for structures completed before the Tay Bridge 
accident, although a system of horizontal bracing was always 
incorporated to assist load distribution etc. 
When a design check was made for wind action the procedure adopted 
was to assume that a uniform pressure of wind acted on the exposed face 
of the bridge and that some fraction of this acted on the lee girders. 
The precise amount depended on an intuitive guess of the degree of 
shielding afforded by the windward members - an unsatisfactory procedure 
because designers did not understand effects such as drag and lift forces. 
To show how. seriously wind forces were underestimated, fig. 3.2 compares 
four loading cases. Fig. 3.2a is based on the wind pressure assumed 
in design - 485 
N/m2 (10 lbs/ft2). 3.2b shows the forces necessary 
to overturn the structure about the base of the lee pier. This 
calculation was made by Mr Henry Law who was commissioned by the Tay 
Bridge Inquiry to analyse the structure after 
the collapse. From the -- 
evidence of the wreckage, ' he showed that the windward columns-were 
inadequately anchored to the pierheads, so he discounted the possibility 
of beam action in the towers. He also showed that this mode of failure 
was more likely than the overturning of the spans on the tops of the 
3 towers. 
Fig-3.2c shows the wind forces suggested by the Board of Trade 
rule which was established after the collapse. Although this was 
ridiculed as extremely conservative by engineers at the time, it is 
interesting to note that the total force and overturning moment generated 
by it is very considerably less than the corresponding quantities cal- 
culated from the 1972 wind loading code, CP3, ch. 5 part 2 (fig. 3.2d) 
Why did Bouch choose such a low figure for the assumed loading? 
" To answer this question it 
is important to understand that his main 
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aim-as a designer was to provide an adequate structure as cheaply 
as possible. Ample evidence of this is provided by his earlier works. 
In designing the Tay crossing he very rightly wanted to know what an 
adequate, but not excessive, provision for wind forces would De. 
-_- 
Consequently he looked around for the best advice available. 
I 
The normal source of information about wind pressure was the 
' 
table communicated to the Royal Society by Smeaton in 1759 
S. 
(Table 3.1), 
but this had long been acknowledged' as over-conservative and inaccurate 
by most authorities. (Prof. Rankine, author of the well-known 
Manual of Civil Engineering6 being the best known exception; he 
thought that the design wind load should be the max. gust pressure 
ever recorded, this being 2660 N/m2 at Glasgow Observatory. For 
reasons to be discussed later this was'not satisfactory. ) 
" were 
-The values given in table 3.1/derived from experiments using the 
rig sketched in fig. 3.3,7 and the records of various velocity 
anemometers. In--the experiments the test plate A travelled round a 
9.1 m orbit at velocities of up to 1.05 m/sec. It will be appreciated 
that the resistance experienced by the plate-was much greater than 
the stagnation pressure of the air stream because eddying round"the ^^ ,- 
edges of the plate created a partial vacuum on the lee surface. 
Values of pressure corresponding to higher wind velocities were extr- 
polated from the experimental results by assuming that pressure was 
proportional to (1) the area. exposed and (2) square of the velocity. 
Thus for most practical cases the air resistance corresponding to an 
assumed wind velocity was considerably over-estimated. 
Edwin Clark commented on this data in his excellent book about 
the Britannia and Conway tubular bridges. 
8 
He dismissed Smeaton's 
figure of 2400 N/m2 uniformly. distributed as "a much overrated value 
for hurricane loading in the British Isles". lie said later 
TABLE 3.1 
"containing the velocity and force of winds, according to their 
common appellations" 
Source: Phil. Trans. Royal Soc. vol 51,1759, p. 164 
.. 
Velocity of the Wind Perpendicular- 
force on one foot 
in Feet in area in pounds 
Common appellations f 
ne hour one avoirdupois [& 
the force e of of winds winds 
second metric equivs. ] 
1 1.47 -0-005 Hardly perceptible 
2 2.93 0.020 Just perceptible 
3 4.40 0.044 it it it 
4 5.8-7 0.079 Gentle, pleasant wind 
5 7.33 0.123 .. It It 
10 14,67 0.492 Pleasant, brisk gale 
15 22.00 1.107 It ýr rr 
20 29.34 1. '968 Very brisk 
25 36.67 3.075 '. , º. - ýý 
30 44.01 4.429 High winds 
35 51.34 6.027 ýý tt 
40 58.68 7.873 Very high 
45 66.01 9.963 " 
50 73.35 12.300 595N/m2 A storm or tempest 
160 88.02 17.715 860N/m2 A great storm 
80 117.36 31.490 1530N/m2 An hurricane 
100 146.20 49.200 2380N/m2 An hurricane that tears 
up trees, carries build- 
ings before it, etc. 
Jr I 
"t 
Fig 3.3. Srmea. ton's test rig. In the experiment on wind pressure, the 
windr; i]. 1 sails were replaced by a board of 3 sq. ft. surface 
area. 
c 
IT =o 
51 13 
-- 
F5-E7 3.4. Czler's pressure plate anemometer. On the grapzs, crnie 
horizontal division repre 'ente`1 an ho r, so the in tru: T. ent 
., not atie 
to record short duration i^a ;E. 
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that "a violent storm exerts a force of about 20 pounds on every square 
foot (= 970N/m2) of surface exposed to its direct action. " 
Bouch was dissatisfied with this information and therefore referred 
to a letter he had received in connection with another of his p::, )jects, 
the Forth Suspension Bridge which he proposed in 1873. ' That plan was 
so novel that the North British Railway who commissioned it had the 
designs scrutinised by a committee of experts (W. H. Barlow, John Hawkshaw, 
Dr Pole, Messrs Bidder &. T E Harrison). They questioned the validity 
of Smeaton's table of wind pressure and applied to the Astronomer Royal 
(Sir George Airy) for an up to date opinion. Airy-was consulted 
because he was responsible for the maintenance of meteorological records 
at a number of stations up and down the country. His reply (which 
the committee endorsed) was received in time for the Tay Bridge 
superstructure to be modified if necessary - indeed for other reasons 
the ironwork was much altered after this date. 
ýr 
Airy wrote, "My dear Sir, '- I. have considered carefully the 
proposal of constructing the suspension bridge over the Forth for 
carrying a railway in two spans of about 1600 ft (490m) each, upon which 
I understand you wish that I should give you my opinion. First upon 
the liability of the bridge to suffer from the action of the wind; 
(secondly upon any points in the construction which might occur to me. 
I will advert here to both subjects. ) We know that upon very 
limited surfaces, and for very limited-times, the pressure of the wind 
does amount to 40 lbs per square foot (1940N/m2) or in Scotland 
probably to more. So far as I am aware our positive knowledge, as 
derived from instrumental record goes no further. But in studying the 
registers it is impossible not to see that those high pressures are 
momentary and it seems probable that they arise from some irregular 
whirlings of the air which extend to no great distance. I should say 
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certainly to no distance comparable with the dimensions of the 
proposed bridge, and that the fairest estimate of the pressures on 
the entire bridge would be formed by taking the mean of the recorded 
pressures at one point of space for a moderate. extent of time as 
- representing the mean pressure upon a moderate extent of space at one 
instant of time. Adopting this consideration. I think we may say that 
the greatest wind pressure to which a plane surface like that of the 
bridge will be subjected on its whole extent, is ten pounds per square 
foot (485 N/m2). ºº 
9 
Searing in mind that the most exposed sections of the Tay Bridge 
consisted of continuous girders more than 305 m long, Bouch being 
dissatisfied with other sources of information felt justified in 
assuming that this advice would apply to the bridge actually in course 
10 
of construction. Moreover the actual magnitude of the wind force had 
been accepted by five very eminent engineers. - It is doubtful that he 
would have been given better advice elsewhere; as late as 1879 the 
official Board of Trade view was that no provision was necessary for 
1 
wind forces in truss bridges of less than 60 m span. 
By comparing this information with that contained in the modern 
Code of Practice it is clear that Sir Thomas's information was grossly 
inaccurate. Perhaps the worse feature of the report quoted is that 
it did not give sufficient quantitative information for the engineer to 
judge whether or not the data covered his problem adequately. Reading 
between the lines, there is a certain vagueness about the document. 
What precisely did the Astronomer Royal mean by very limited surfaces 
and very limited times? What did he really know about conditions in 
Scotland? Did his instrumental records really justify his conclusions? 
These matters were all investigated by the Court of Inquiry and it is worth 
setting out what the Commissioners discovered. 
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3.2.1 Gusts 
On the. subject of the length and'extent of gusts Airy really knew 
absolutely nothing. Cross-examined by counsel for Sir Thomas Bouch 
his opinion was decidedly unformed; - 
' 
16122 Q. I would like to ask your opinion upon this question. Do 
you. believe that any such pressure as 40 or 50 lbs to the square 
foot (1940-2400 N/m2) ever obtains over so large an extent of 
surface as is represented by-a span of the Tay Bridge - that is 
to say a length of 245 ft (75 m), and a height, including the 
piers, to the top of the girders of 100 ft (30 m)? 
A. I have no means of knowing. 
s 
16123 Q. What is your judgement upon the point? 
A. I can conceive the course of the wind on these occasions to 
be almost as irregular as the course of streams in a river; there 
are some parts in which the pressure will much exceed that in 
others, in fact, the space through which the greatest force 
prevails is limited, I imagine. 
16124 Q. Although you have observations which indicate so high a 
pressure as 40 or even 50 lbs to the foot (1940-2400 
N/m2) 
at 
a particular point, is it not, in your opinion, highly improbable 
that any such pressure has ever obtained simultaneously over a large 
area? 
A. I really cannot say that I have any very definite opinion 
about that. 
These answers boil down to the fact that the only information Airy 
had on the important issue of gust loading was the records of the 
individual Osler anemometers (fig. 3.4) maintained by just three of the 
meagre national network of Meteorological Stations. The instruments in 
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question gave a crude measure of peak wind forces experienced by a 
small. flat plate, but the movement of the recording paper was so slow 
that no information was available concerning the duration of gusts. 
None of them were kept in Scotland anyway. 
13 
Any other direct measure of wind pressure that Airy might have 
received came from anemometers of the Lind type (fig"3.5). This 
instrument (basically the same as a modern Pitot tube) was invented 
by James Lind in 177514 and was often used on sailing ships during 
the 19th century. Here, therefore, the idea was to record average - 
1 
wind pressure as and when required so that the speed of the ship might 
be estimated from a rule of thumb knowledge of its normal performance. 
As a result the instrument was not supplied with a complicated recording 
system. It gave no indication of the magnitude, or duration of gust 
loading because a contraction at the bottom of the U tube damped out 
sudden oscillations of the fluid. 
The instruments for measuring wind velocity were no more helpful; 
-Robinson's cup anemometer (fig-3.6) was widely used, but principally 
for recording the hourly run of wind. As a result the only mechanism 
attached to the rotating cups was a revolution counter geared to take 
account of the difference between the velocity of the wind and the 
speed at which the cups spun round. (In fact, the relation between 
these quantities was not well established and varied from instrument to 
instrument. ) 
The Inquiry called for the expert opinion of Mr R It Scott (Secretary X 1,7- 
of the Meteorological Council) and he said that records from these 
instruments were susceptible to considerable inaccuracy for periods of 
five minutes or less, so they also were useless for measuring gust 
duration) Another snag was that even if the wind velocity could be 
Fig 3.5. Lind's portable wind gauge, 
principally used on board 
sailing ships. 
Image removed due to third party copyright
'Fig 3.6. 
Robinson's cup 
anemometer. 
Fra. 32. 
Fig 3.7. Variation of wind velocity'with height 
Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyright
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gauged accurately there was considerable doubt about the relation between 
this quantity and the pressure experienced by actual structural components. 
The fact that none of these anemometers were fitted with sensitive 
recording mechanisms reflects a lack of interest in gust loading rather 
than insuperable technical difficulties. Dr Robinson, for example, was 
able to fit a recorder with an enlarged time scale to his instrument as 
soon as the Court of Inquiry asked him to do so. 
16 
Another aspect of the problem that was not properly investigated 
before the accident was the area over which the gust loads acted. This 
would have been possible using a network of anemometers each supplied 
with a clock and sensitive recording mechanism, but the impracticalities 
of the process meant that experiments on the spatial extent of gusts 
were not conducted before the introduction of electrically-coupled 
-instruments. - 
4 
.\ 
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3.2.2. Winds on Site 
Thomas Stevenson, however, did use a mechanical method to 
/, 
tackle a further problem of which Airy was completely unaware. Using 
six cup anemometers on a pole fifty feet high he carried out an' 
investigation of the variation of wind velocity with height and 
showed that the velocity increased parabolically above a boundary 
layer wherein the increase was irregular owing to the roughness of the 
ground surface (fig. 3.7). 
17 
His interest in the matter, of course, was 
in connection with the family engineering practice which specialised 
in lighthouses. Founded by Thomas's father, Robert, the firm was 
largely responsible for the network of lights built up round the 
hostile Scottish coats! To illustrate the importance of this work 
(which was carried out In 1878) a gale registering 44m/s 6.1 m above 
ground was found to correspond to 61 m/s at 30.5 m while the associated 
value of wind pressure rose by 88%. 
Another weakness in the Astronomer Royal's report was that it only 
just touched on the question of how conditions vary from site to site. 
Most of Airy's information was gathered from instruments kept in and 
around London where the ground formation and surface features are 
comparatively sheltered. Today's designers use a wind speed of 38 m/s 
in that area whereas 53 m/s or more'. is allowed for exposed sites in 
Scotland. 
r. 
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3.2.3" Conclusion & Summary 
Perhaps these paragraphs seem unduly critical of one man. If 
this is the'case it should be remembered that Airy's opinionp were 
- endorsed by some of the best talents of the day. Moreover, contemporary 
authors rarely mentioned the subject - Rankine dismissed it in the single 
paragraph cited above, while Humbe 
r& 
Stephenson did not discuss it at 
all. Airy's letter was also used as the basis of questions put to 
two expert witnesses called by the Inquiry to discuss wind loading, 
neither of whom (Prof. G G_Stoke , Mr RH Scott) was able to offer more 
definitive information so the report can fairly be taken to represent 
the general opinion of the day. 
In summary perhaps it is worth reiterating the lesson to be 
learned from Airy's report. Here was a statement based on scanty 
information in which uncertainties and inaccuracies were casually 
glossed over. At best the meteorologist should have said that very 
little useful data was actually available and that an on site investi- 
gation was really necessary. Failing this he ought to have referred 
the engineers to the source material so that they could form their own 
opinions on the doubts surrounding the subject,. "' ' 
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3.3 }low the Disaster might have been avoided 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The misunderstanding that arose between Bouch and Airy over 
the report discussed above was a breakdown in communication at a 
personal level. It was particularly unfortunate that the engineer seems 
to have relied-solely on this source of information and it is interesting 
to look more generally at the work_of his contemporaries to see if it 
might'have been possible at that time for the Profession as a whole to 
have devised a system for avoiding the situation in which an important 
problem remained unrecognised until a disaster occurred. 
Among the leading engineers of the later 19th century Benjamin 
Baker (designer of the Forth Railway Bridge) was making a name for him- 
self during the 1860s. During this decade he began to realise that 
wind loads might prove significant in future generations of structures. 
In the course of his work he made notes of wind damage and later made 
simple calculations of the uniform wind pressure that would have caused 
the accidents. By studying objects as varied as stone walls and factory 
chimneys he developed a pretty clear understanding of the basic nature 
and magnitude of wind loads: his records suggested 1360 
N/m2 as an 
upper bound for the pressure on large structures 
Y 
After the Tay Bridge 
collapse he commended the collection of this type of straightforward 
data to his colleagues. 
5 
His observations led him to appreciate the 
special value of collecting information relating to actual structures. 
In the course of his researches, he found that the eminent American 
bridge engineer, Charles Shaler Smith had collected and published records 
of truss. bridges destroyed by wind on that continent. 
6 
These accidents 
(Table 3.2) led Smith to conclude that 1450 N/m2 was a sensible basic 
allowance for wind-'forces. 
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3.3.2 Practices in America 
Baker's work suggests two of the important concepts regarding the 
prediction of accidents. Firstly he established the usefulness of 
recording failures that were not fully explained by existing knowledge, 
but his report of American experiences was really more important because 
it pointed out the value of keeping track of developments abroad. 
In this particular case Bouch and the other British engineers 
could have learnt quite a lot from their contemporaries in other 
countries. Although the concept of building-light truss bridges to 
serve a railway while trade built up was new to Britain in the 1860s 
and 70s, it had been accepted practice in America for more than 20 years. 
As a result, engineers in that country met with most of the problems 
pertaining to such structures before the British came up against them. 
The following extracts dealing with wind loading come from Hermann 
Haupt's widely circulate d. _treatise.. 
on. bridge construction wh ch. was. 
21 
published as early-as 1856. He wrote, "The use of lateral bracing is 
principally to guard against the effects of wind, and other disturbing 
causes tending to produce lateral flexure in the roadway. The ordinary 
bracing to resist this action consists of ties and braces similarly dis- 
posed to those in the main truss except that equal strength is required 
in the direction of each diagonal of the horizontal panels.. The' 
greatest lateral strain is that produced by the action of a high wind; 
assuming the force of wind at 15 lbs/ft2 
(725 N/m2) as a maximum ... 
(he gives a specimen calculation for the particular truss he is discussing) 
... the effect of 
this force would be estimated precisely ä's the strain 
of a uniform load upon a bridge ... ". 
Later, (one of the book's faults is that it is imprecisely laid 
" out and rather rambling - probably due 
to the fact that it was written 
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over a period of about 10 years) the author was less certain about the 
allowance of 725 
N/m2. He noted this in discussing the fate of one of 
his own bridges carried away by a sudden wind: 
2g 
"It is desirable that 
further experiments should be made to ascertain the force of wind in 
violent storms. It is probable that it is generally underrated. 
The writer addressed letters, to gentlemen who had been engaged in 
making observations with the anemometer. The most satisfactory answer 
was given by Professor Bache who stated that on Saturday 5th August 
1843 at 8 o'clock p. m. a tornado passed within a quarter of a mile of 
the observatory at Girard College and the force of wind was so great as 
to exceed the range of the spring and to break the wire connecting it with 
the plate of the anemometer; the force required exceeded 42 lbs to the 
square foot (2040 N/m2) which was the'range of possible movement of the 
registering arm. The next greatest force of wind was 14 lbs to the square 
foot (680 
N/m2) from 4 to 5 o'clock a. m. on the 17th February 1842. 
From 0. to 5 hours a. m. on the same day the mean was 12.6 pounds (610 N/m2) 
from 0 to 11 hours a. m. the mean- was 11.4 pounds (556 N/m2) and for the 
day 7.69 lbs. (370 N/m2). " 
" Here, then, the problem was isolated ten years before the 
first wind loading failure of a bridge in service, but even in his own 
country Haupt's words went unheeded; partly, no doubt -because of the 
poor quality and rather outdated content of much of his text but also 
because there was no provision for research among the bridge-builders 
of his day - engineers who fought each other for design and construct 
contracts had no money to spare for projects which were for the general 
good. 
. 
17" 
a. 
t 
4e. 
This is reflected by the effect of the failures listed in Table 
3.2. which were rather flippantly used by the American engineers as full 
F 
TABLE 3.2 
AMERICAN TRUSS BRIDGES DESTROYED 
BY WIND 
Name Date 
Wrecked 
Description 
Havre de 1866 Ten 76 m (250') spans of a wooden Howe 
Grace truss bridge bl own over. Uniform wind 
Md. load to cause d estruction 1310-. N/m2 
(27 lbs/ft2) 
Decatur* 1870 Two spans of a truss brid ge blown over; 
Alabama force required 1260 N/m2 (26 lbs/ft2) 
Omaha 1877 Two 76 m (250') spans of an iron Post 
Nebraska truss blown over; force required 
905 N/m2 (18.7 lbs/ft2) 
Meredosia 1880 One 46 m. (150') span of a wooden Howe 
Illinois truss overturned. Force required 
1160 N/m2 ( 24 lbs/ft2) 
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scale experiments suggesting a lower bound to a design wind pressure 
arbitrarily assumed to be uniform. Whenever a collapse occurred the 
various engineers made"a slight alteration to the specifications which 
were then fashionable as a basis for awarding design and construct 
__. contracts. 
By the mid 1870s a typical figure for wind loading was 
about 2000 N/m2 which was reasonable enough except that it was 
based on experience rather than experiment. 
9 
Just before the Tay Bridge opened TC Clarke came over from 
America to read a paper and lead a discussion on iron bridges of 
30 
very long span at the Institution of Civil Engineers The practice 
with which he was familiar was by this time sufficiently advanced for 
him to be shocked by the attitude of English engineers to wind load, 
and in particular by the fact that they did not recognise that these 
forces could constitute the. limiting factor for bridge design. "A 
bridge is a complex structure, " he said, "because it has to bear not only 
, the forces of gravity but also the side pressure of the wind. Mr Young 
stated that it is a simple matter to provide against the force of wind 
but it is really the most difficult and complicated part of the problem. 
The-most economical depth possible has to be used to resist the force 
of gravity but then the side pressure prevents the-use of an - v. 
economical height; consequently the bridge when finished is a 
compromise between the results of the two forces. This is why the long 
span bridges are comparatively not so high as those of. shorter span. 
In spans of less than 200 feet the proportion is 1/5 or 1/6"ße 
This statement confirms the earlier evidence that American 
practice was considerably ahead of that in Britain during the 1870sß thus 
proving that British engineers could have learned something useful by 
keeping track of developments abroad. 
0 
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3.3.3" Developments in Britain 
However, it is more realistic to see what could have been 
learnt from works carried out at home. This is because the necessary 
-lines of international communication were not established until the 
mid-1870s when important structures like the Severn and Tay bridges 
were already under construction. 
It is possible that important trends in design and construction 
could have been detected from a continuous record of the structures 
being built in Britain. To elaborate, the general direction of bridge 
building during the hundred years after the beginning of the Industrial 
revolution (c. 1760) was towards structures which used progressively less 
material to carry a. given load (Tables 3.3 and 3.4: ). At the begin- 
ning of this period there were only two types of crossing: masonry 
r 
arches where durability and/or appearance were important, and timber 
trestles for a host of moreorless makeshift structures throughout the 
country. Wind loads did not seriously affect these bridges, in the 
case of stone structures because the weight of masonry was adequate to 
resist overturning and in the case of the wooden bridges because the "i 
. -) cl r. Ir Ir a. 1.111 ir. 
sites were never particularly exposed. At this time other problems 
were much more important - scour round the piers and the action of 
floods being typical examples. 
During the last twenty years of the 18th century and the first 
twenty of the 19th cast iron became accepted as an alternative material 
for building arch bridges (fig 3.8). Although the weight of these 
structures was only one or two per cent of a comparable masonry bridge 
the spans built were never large or exposed enough to be susceptible to 
wind damage. Anyway the arch bridge which presents little surface area 
TABLE 3.3 
SOME IMPORTANT BRIDGES IN BRITAIN 1770 - 1830 
/ 
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Type Name Date Designer 
Loading 
R=Road 
C=Canal, 
Spans(m) 
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Cast Iron 
Arch Ironbridge 1779 Pritchard R 31 378. )V 7 17 
Sunderland 1796 Paine R 72 -260 
R 
9 39 
Pont )I 3.7 
Cysyllte 1805 Telford C 19x16 24 )A 3.7 39 
Southwark 1819 Rennie R 63-73-63 1665 
L 13 10 
Tewkesbury 1826 Telford R 52 500 )E 7- 9 
Stone Arch Over 1827 Telford R 46 4000 8 9 
Suspension Union 1820 Brown R 110 100 0.5 4.5 10 
Menai 1826 Telford R 168 644 0.5 9 33 
Hammersmith 1827 Clark R 129 - 1.5 9 10 
{ 
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TABLE 3.4 
" WROUGHT IRON RAILWAY BRIDGES IN EXPOSED SITUATIONS 
/ 
Name Designer 
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Tay "Bouch 3170 27 1878 1 75 1.92. 5 9 350 
(max) 288 
Victoria 
(Montreal) R. Stephensori 2900 12 1859 1 100 5 1350 
(max) 
Severn Keeling & 1270 21 1879 1 100 200 bow/ 190 
Owen (max) sbing 
Saltash I. K. Brunel 673 32 1859 1 139 5 225 
Boyne McNeil & 535 
, 
27 1855 2 80 362 9 7 140 
Barton - 
Kent Brunlees 480 7 1857 1 9 8 5 1 15 
Leven Brunlees 480 8 1857 1 9 8 4 1 18 
Britannia R. Stephenson 460 37 1850 2 152 1420 4.5 9 600 
per 
tMCb 
Crumlin Kennard 460 63 1857 2 46 
88 8 5 62 
Belah Bouch 300 60 1861 1 18 
16 6 2 25 
Notes: Where two figures are given for span weight, the upper 
is the weight of iron 
I 
Fig 3.8. Two I5Oft. span bridges by Telford. 
Above, the iron ach at Bonar(I+lI-I2) 
Below, the masonry arch at Over(I825). 
Image removed due to third party copyright
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to the wind at mid span is inherently one of the better forms that can 
be exposed to a gale. 
Suspension bridges became popular after 1810, and frequently 
/ 
suffered destruction in high winds. Engineers might have made a note 
ythai 
wind (not just aerodynamic effects) needed consideration in light 
bridges but they apparently overlooked this. The railway builders can 
be excused on the grounds that they soon discovered that the suspension 
bridge as known at the time proved to be wholly inadequate for train 
loadings. Moreover the first generation (1830-55) of railways in 
England demanded and were given monumental structures for their 
principal bridges in which wind forces were insignificant. Cyclones 
and hurricanes seemed to be the only wind loads to be guarded against but 
since these freak storms rarely hit the British Isles no special 
provisions were made. 
In the 1860s & 70s railway investors turned their attention 
to the construction of secondary and in many cases speculative railways, 
the great main lines having become well established by that time. The 
new routes were generally built'as cheaply as possible so that the 
promoters would not lose too heavily even if their line failed to 
generate any traffic; but nevertheless there were. frequently formidable 
physical obstacles to overcome - such as long estuary crossings or 
high level bridges above deep valleys. Against this background light 
truss bridgework became an important type of structure, and built by 
a master engineer it could do its job effectively and efficiently. 
But in the hands of a second rate designer, an engineer content to 
apply existing techniques to a new type of bridge difficulties and 
deficiences could and did arise. 
This situation could probably have been avoided if contemporary 
rJ -- -- --- --- -- -- - -------- 
- 76 - 
practice had included proper provision for reviewing new developments. 
Such effort as was made in this direction was never published in a 
more helpful form than the sort of classification presented in 
tables 3.3 and 3.4. The old collections of data and statistics from 
which these figures have been talon just tried to give a general picture 
of a number of structures and thus different authors collected different 
parameters. As Benjamin Baker commented in his book on long and 
short span railway bridgeszthis meant that there was really no chance 
of comparing structures even when-they were designed to fulfil the 
same purpose. 
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3.3.4 Important Design Parameters 
A satisfactory review might have been possible had an attempt 
first been made to isolate the really important features of, contemporary 
design philosophy. Looking back over the mid-century source material 
it can be seen that the contemporary mind regarded low cost, economy 
of material, rigidity and ease of construction as the four most 
important ingredients of a satisfactory bridge. Of these cost does 
r 
not constitute a valid basis for comparing structures because, quite 
apart. from the fact that there were great fluctuations in the price of 
33 iron in the mid 19th century, the money spent on nominally similar 
structures was always subject to local variation. High cost 
resulted from matters such as awkward foundations, an isolated site 
or the need to work exceptionally quickly. Unusually low estimates 
sometimes reflected the outstanding efficiency of an individual builder 
but might equally conceal a skimped programme-of works or, possibly, 
inadequate design. 
With regard to other design factors, it is reasonable to say 
that between 1855 and 1875 the train loads to be provided for in medium 
span structures did not alter very niuch 
34 (fig 3.9), that the 
acceptable degree of rigidity remained constant35and that ease of cons- 
truction was a matter of subtlety in design detail rather than overall 
Consequently the comparison of the structural effi- design conception. 
36 
ciency achieved in the bridges of the period becomes a matter of tabulating 
the quantity of material used for the various elements of the structures. 
Of these the most important were the iron piers and the girderwork 
supported upon them. 
The economic weight of material in bridge spans was a subject 
which interested writers as well as practising engineers. While 
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Fig 3.9. Assumed live loads for railway bridges. 
Early railway engineers assumed live loads at one ton/ft. 
The graph shows information abstracted from B. Baker's 
"Short span railway bridges"(I873). The basic figures are 
shown by the unbroken line; the dotted line includes the 
allowance made for fatigue, jolting, high speed etc. 
." 
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acknowledging that a mathematical treatment linking the many possible 
variables could not be attempted, they put forward empirical formulae 
from time to time. The most interesting of these are represented 
graphically on fig. 3.10. 
Rankine's expression suggested that the weight of metal for a 
new span-could be predicted from the weight used in an existing 
31 
bridge of comparable design but different span and design loads. A 
defect of this method was that it gave unrealistically low weights for 
short bridges. . 
" This was remedied by Benjamin Baker in his essay on Short Span 
300 
Railway Bridges, where a table of weights based on a combination of 
theory and the results achieved in practice was given. These figures 
were based on the most up to date information available regarding rail- 
way loads, and can be taken, as a satisfactory upper bound for the 
end of the period. The graph modelled on Rankine's method applied to 
a successful but outstandingly light bridge provides the locus of a 
lower limit. 
It will be seen that the weight of iron in the main Tay Bridge 
girders lies between these curves so the conclusion is that these members 
contained enough material for a satisfactory structure to be formed. 
Although the thirteen longest spans were wrecked in the great 
storm of 1879 many of the remainder were transferred to the new Tay 
Bridge (1882), thus suggesting that something other than the girders 
constituted the primary deficiency in the structure. 
The other main component of light truss viaducts were the piers 
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Fig 3. II. Boyne Viaduct. 
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supporting the spans. In the earliest British examples masonry towers 
were used ( fig. 3.11), but it was soon shown that iron could 
provide a cheaper solution39 Designers found that they had to find a 
balance between using a few heavily built towers supporting long spans 
and more, lighter piers carrying shorter trusses. Low level crossings 
obviously favoured the latter solution while high bridges usually had 
longer spans. 
In the words of Humber's book on bridge construction the 
"... first point to be considered (in the design of piers) is the area 
required to support the structure and load. As the weight acts 
directly upon the piers without experiencing any deviation from its 
normal direction, the area to support it will vary as the load 
supported .. . ". 
The author did not say much more about pier design but even 
the criterion quoted is sufficient to suggest that the Tay Bridge 
structure was most unusual in this respect. From the series of 
diagrams-'(figs. 3.12 - 3-15:. 3-12 - 3.14 are of structures which were 
recognised as innovatory and daring in their own day), it can be seen 
that the ratio'of span weight to pier weight was very high in the 
Tay Bridge, and that the piers were very light for a structure crossing 
a wide estuary, very much lighter for example than the piers built for 
the Severn Bridge. 
Turning to the silhouette drawings (figs. 3.16 - 3.22) the 
completely unprecedented length and exposure of the bridge can be 
readily appreciated. 
Combining these several observations, it is tempting to suggest 
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that an astute engineer, even if versed solely in British practice, 
could have detected that the structure was a sufficiently new departure 
to merit special investigation. Further clues that the bridge was 
inadequate to resist wind loads could have come from the experiences of 
engineers in America, (mentioned above), and from a fully comprehensive 
register of innovatory bridges at home and abroad. Unfortunately 
for Bouch none of these aids were readily available to British 
engineers in the 1870s although the source material was all accessible 
in one form or another. 
N1, 
0 10 20 ;0 40 ft. 
Fig 3.12. Crumlin Viaduct: the Isabella. pier. 
Weight of su-Perstrue ture supported ... I00 tons 
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The .; evern railway : ridge, 
pier =gor a ft. 
Weight of cuper'3 ructure supported... 200 tons (approx) 
of p . ers above 
high garer ... 
665 tons (approx) 
(the cast iron tubes sho, arr, above 
were filled with. concrete and braced 
very heavily from top to bottom). 
Resistance to overturnin& about base. ecc'" tlon'" ft. 
max span length z1) ft, 
KeelinS and Owen, engineers. 
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Fig 3.15. 
`i"h¬ ? ay raiiw^.. y brid. o. e. 
pier for a typical high 
girder span. 
Thomas Bouch, engineer. 
Weight of superstructure supported... 288 tons 
Weight of iron pier (main tubes ... 105 tons 
filled with concrete?. 
Resistance to overturning about base. 4320tonn ft. 
Max span length 245 ft. 
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3.4. Summary 
Sohie conclusions relevant to modern practice are presented 
to close this survey of the Tay Bridge tragedy. The first part of the 
discussion of the wind loading problem showed how Bouch managed to 
build an immense bridge using invalid design information, and pointed 
out that the Astronomer Royal should never have given advice in such a 
form that the uncertainties about the magnitude and duration of wind 
forces were glossed over. 
A parallel relevant to present day engineering can be drawn from 
the modern use of Codes of Practice for design. All the information 
contained in these documents should. be backed up by a handbook covering 
the data on which they are based and the range of applications the 
drafting Committee had in mind when the document was prepared. At 
the present time some, but not all, codes are supported in this way. 
The second section of the discussion suggested that there is a 
point in trying to document and review developments in various aspects 
of Civil Engineering procedure as they take place. 
In the case of the Tay Bridge a properly kept record of changes. 
in design parameters which the contemporary engineers considered important 
would have helped avert the tragedy. Classified information of this 
type should be maintained today to enable a watch to be kept on the working 
of Codes of Practice. 
It was also shown that a register of accidents would have 
shown the susceptibility of light trusses to wind forces several years 
before Bouch's bridge was destroyed. This suggests that it is worth 
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keeping a careful record of all incompletely explained accidents 
with a view to detecting new problems before they cause a 
major collapse. 
